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ADVANCING CIVIL RIGHTS, THE NEXT
GENERATION: THE GENETIC
INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION
ACT OF 2008 AND BEYOND
Morse Hyun-Myung Tant
ABSTRACT
On the leading edge of civil rights law and bioethics/healthcare
law, this Article provides the first law review analysis of the recently
passed Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008,
which extends important protection against discrimination in health
insurance and employment. GINA also bolsters genetic research by
freeing research subjects from the threat of genetic discrimination.
This Article demonstrates how GINA further protects this society
against the rising dangers of genetic discrimination beyond previously
existing federal and state law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Civil rights in the 21t century and beyond encounter an increas-
ingly serious challenge in genetic discrimination as the march of
genetic technologies continues forward. Dr. Francis Collins, the head
of the Human Genome project admonishes: "Since all of us have
dozens of genetic glitches that put us at risk for disease, we all have a
reason to be concerned about the possible misuse of genetic informa-
tion."' If our particular glitches place us out of favor with the prevail-
' Francis S. Collins, Dir., Nat'l Human Genome Research Inst., Regarding
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ing legal/political winds, then any one of us can find ourselves with-
out health insurance, employment - or worse. So none of us find our-
selves immune to the possibility of having our civil rights violated -
due to nothing more than the particular genomic hand dealt to us.
One need look no further than our country's own eugenic past to
see not only what can happen, but what did actually happen already in
violation of civil rights. In 1927, the famous Supreme Court Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes handed down his opinion in Buck v. Bell, in
which he opined that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough, 2
and thus stamped the approval of the highest court in our land on
forced sterilization. In this case, Carrie Buck was the daughter of a
"feeble minded" mother, as well as the mother of a "feeble minded"
child.3 The Virginia statute in question determined that the steriliza-
tion of mentally impaired individuals would promote the health of the
patient and the health of society. Accepting that "heredity plays an
important part in the transmission of insanity, imbecility, etc.," the
Supreme Court held that: "[i]t is better for all the world, if instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve
for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit
from continuing their kind."5
No less than thirty-two American states pushed through compul-
sory eugenic sterilization statutes from 1907 to 1937.6 These statutes
forced the removal of reproductive capacities in genetically "undesir-
able" groups of people, such as the "feeble-minded."
However, leading historians of the eugenics movement point to a
1936 report from the American Neurological Association that
expressed disapprobation for eugenic, forced sterilization as a turning
point that, together with a 1939 declaration by the International
Genetics Congress attacking Nazi eugenic theories, decisively influ-
enced the America of that era against eugenics.7 The complexities of
genetic science and neuroscience mixed with strong ethical sensibili-
ties pointed away from such crass eugenics. No additional state laws
the Passage of Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2005 (S. 306) (Feb. 17,
2005), http://www.genome.gov/13014311 (last visited Jan. 9, 2009).
2 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
3 Id. at 205.
4 Id.
' Id. at 206-07.
6 Edward J. Larson, Confronting Scientific Authority with Religious Values:
Eugenics in American History, in "GENETIC ENGINEERING: A CHRISTIAN RESPONSE -
CRUCIAL CONSIDERATION S IN SHAPING LIFE 105, 106 (Timothy J. Demy & Gary P.
Stewart eds., 1999).
7 Id. at 117.
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mandating eugenic sterilization prevailed afterwards, and the existing
state laws increasingly fell into disuse and disfavor.'
Through the discoveries of genetic science in the Human Genome
Project and beyond, the dangers of a new eugenics and genetic
discrimination have taken on ever more sophisticated and potentially
deleterious forms. The Human Genome Project is now essentially
complete, with scientists laboring currently to further understand how
groups of genes interact. The ability to uncover more and more dis-
eases with genetic etiologies has been expanding greatly. In a statistic
that will have most likely expanded substantially when this article
prints, "over 15,500 recognized genetic disorders affect 13 million
Americans." 9 Along these lines, consider that genetics cause around a
quarter of infant deaths,' ° half of the instances of mental retardation,'I
the inherited susceptibility of 5-10% of cancers,' 2 and a component in
a tenth of adult chronic diseases, including diabetes, rheumatoid ar-
thritis and heart disease.1
3
Francis Collins projects that a $1,000 complete genetic screening
for any person remains a realistic goal within the next decade. 14 The
challenge remains of how to reap the potentially immense benefits of
genetic research and medical intervention in curing actual diseases,
without re-opening the Pandora's Box of eugenics as well as genetic
discrimination, and thereby trammeling civil rights.
There exists a mounting body of reports from individuals who
have been, or who believe they have been, discriminated against based
upon their genetic information:
8 Id
9 Victor A. McKusick, MENDELIAN INHERITANCE IN MAN: A CATALOG OF
HUMAN GENES AND GENETIC DISORDERS (1 th ed. 1994); See generally DIGAMBER S.
BORGAONKAR, CHROMOSOMAL VARIATION IN MAN (7th ed., 1994) (cataloging over
7000 reports of structural aberrations, polymorphisms and fragile sites).
10 R. J. Berry et al., Birth Weight-Specific Infant Mortality Due to Congenital
Anomalies, 1960 and 1980, 102 PUB. HEALTH REP. 171,172 (1987).
I1 A.W.H. Emery, and D.L. Rimoin, eds., Principles and Practice of Medical
Genetics, 2nd edition (Edinburgh and New York: Churchill Livingston, 1990).12 KATHERINE SCHNEIDER, COUNSELING ABOUT CANCER: STRATEGIES FOR
GENETIC COUNSELING 9 (2d ed., 2002).
13 See D.J. WEATHERALL, THE NEW GENETICS AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 193
(3d ed. 1991).
14 Nat'l Human Genome Research Inst., NHGRI Policy Roundtable Sum-
mary: The Future of Genomic Medicine: Policy Implications for Research and Medi-
cine, Nov. 16, 2005, http://www.genome.gov/17516574. Francis Collins is the cur-
rent Director of the National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI). Id This
roundtable discussion addressed policies to further the development of human genom-
ics and the translation of this science into improved health care. Id.
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" A recent survey conducted by the Eunice Kennedy Shriver
Center discovered almost 600 cases where individuals lost
employment because of their predispositions to genetic dis-
eases. 15
" For example, a young social worker mentioned that her
mother had died of Huntington's Disease. Because of the
50% chance of developing the disease, she was denied her
position. 16
" A 40-year old woman with an excellent employment record
participated in a genetic survey, which revealed that she
possessed the BRCA1 gene - a gene that is linked to some
forms of breast and ovarian cancers. In prophylactic sur-
gery to reduce her chances of developing this form of can-
cer, she had her breasts, ovaries and uterus removed. Nev-
ertheless, despite her efforts to reduce her chances, she was
still fired.' 7
* After suffering a heart attack, one man's insurer "refused to
pay the hospital bills or cover future treatment for cardio-
vascular disease" because a genetic test revealed that he
possessed a genetic predisposition to high cholesterol. The
insurer determined that the genetic condition, being present
since birth, constituted a preexisting condition.1
8
* In addition to those possessing genetic disorders, family
members are at risk of genetic discrimination. For example,
those with a family history of Huntington's Disease will
face discrimination, even though the disease is rather rare,
affecting one in 10,000. Based on calculations, there are
150,000 relatives of Huntington's disease patients at risk in
the United States. In Boston, a woman with a family his-
tory of the disease applied thirteen times for health insur-
ance - and was turned down by every company until she
took a genetic test to prove she had not inherited the dis-
ease. She was even unable to obtain health insurance for
her children.'
9
15 Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, An Equality Paradigm for Prevent-
ing Genetic Discrimination, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1341, 1351-52 (2002).
16 id.
17 id.
18 Richard A. Bornstein, Genetic Discrimination, Insurability and Legisla-
tion: A Closing of the Legal Loopholes, 4 J. L. & POL'Y 551, 566-568 (1996) (quoting
Susan ince, Predictive Testing: A Bite of the Apple, HARv. HEALTH LETTER, June,
1995, note 5, at 4).
'9 Id. at 566.
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Many statistics, numbers and reports document possible instances
of genetic discrimination. Most of these studies document a continu-
ing trepidation about the misuse of genetic information by third
parties, most notably employers and insurance companies.2°
* A 1996 study of the perceptions of 332 members of genetic
disorder support groups revealed that, as a result of testing
positive for one or more of 101 different genetic disorders,
25% of respondents believed they were refused life insur-
ance, 22% believed they were denied health insurance, and
13% believed that they were denied or fired from a job.
Concerning genetic testing, 9% refused to be tested for ge-
netic conditions, 18% did not reveal genetic information to
insurers, and 17% did not reveal this information to em-
ployers - all for fear of facing genetic discrimination.2'
" Many Americans charily avoid taking advantage of new
breakthroughs in genetic testing for fear that the results will
not be used to improve their health, but rather to deny them
jobs or health insurance.
* In 1995, a Harris poll of the general public revealed that
85% of those surveyed were very concerned or somewhat
concerned that insurers or employers might have access to
and use their genetic information.
* A 1997 telephone survey found that 63% of respondents
would not submit to genetic testing if health insurers or em-
ployers could gain access to the results. Moreover, 85% of
respondents felt that employers should be prohibited from
obtaining genetic information about prospective and current
employees.23
* Genetic counselors report that many of their patients are
concerned about the misuse and abuse of genetic informa-
tion - to the point that patients conceal the information even
from their doctors. This secrecy may have disastrous re-
sults for a patient's health. For example, a woman whose
doctor is unaware that she has the BRCA1 gene, and there-
fore has a genetic predisposition to cancer, will not receive
20 S. REP. No. 110-48, at 6 (2007).
21 E. Virginia Lapham, Chahira Kozma & Joan 0. Weiss, Genetic Discrimi-
nation: Perspectives of Consumers, 274 SCIENCE 621 (1996).
22 DEP'T OF LABOR, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GENETIC INFORMATION AND THE
WORKPLACE (1998), available at http://www.genome.gov/pfv.cfin?pagelD=
10001732.
23 id.
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a proper warning or be aware of necessary preventative
medicine alternatives.24
Serious concerns of employers engaging in unwanted or covert
genetic testing of employees not only have a current basis, but the
potential for extensive expansion in the future. In 2000, the American
Management Association conducted a "Workplace Testing Survey."
Of 2,133 employers surveyed, seven responded that their company
performed genetic testing of employees. Of the seven, four reported
genetic testing of job applicants, and six reported genetic testing of
employees. An earlier study of Fortune 500 companies in 1989 con-
ducted by the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
found that out of 330 respondents, 12 admitted to genetic testing of
employees.25
According to the American Academy of Actuaries, private insur-
ers do not require applicants to undergo genetic testing, nor do they
use genetic information to limit coverage by considering genetic
proclivities as preexisting conditions. 6 A 2000 study conducted by
Stephen Rich and Mark Hall found few well-documented cases of
health insurers asking for or using genetic test results in underwriting
decisions. Although some insurers use family history for common
diseases such as heart disease, cancer and diabetes, the insurance
industry reported that this practice is used to evaluate preexisting con-
ditions and not to predict future illness.27 Yet, merely because the
insurance industry states that it does not consider genetic information
in its current decisions, "[t]his does not mean that health insurers
never have and never will engage in genetic discrimination. '2 8
Furthermore, indications exist that insurance companies seek to dis-
cern future illness through current genetic predispositions for breast
cancer (BRCA I and 2), high cholesterol and high blood pressure. 29
Incidents of genetic discrimination have been an ongoing concern
of the Department of Health and Human Services. In January 2000,
the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing (SACGT)
gathered perspectives on genetic testing through a public forum.3°
24 S. REP. No. 110-48, at 6.
25 Id. at 7.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 8 (citation omitted); See generally Mark A. Hall & Steven S. Rich,
Laws Restricting Health Insurers' Use of Genetic Information: Impact on Genetic
Discrimination, 66 AM. J. HuM. GENETICS 293-94 (2000) ("Information from genetic
tests is the sensible point of concern because that is where the fear of insurance dis-
crimination has the greatest discernible impact.").
28 Id. at 303.
29 See Id. at 297.
30 MICHELE SCHOONMAKER & ERIN D. WILLIAMS, CSR REPORT FOR
HEALTH MATRIX
The testimonies revealed several cases of genetic discrimination.
During these consultations, the SACGT heard from individuals who
were concerned about the abuse of genetic information by health
insurers and employers, whose fears of genetic discrimination
dissuaded them from undergoing genetic tests, and who would con-
sider paying out of pocket for genetic tests to prevent the results from
posting onto their medical records. 31 This trepidation in the face of
genetic testing may be a deterrent to the development of genetic tests
and preclude individuals from benefiting from the information these
tests provide.32
Given the history of eugenics, the increasing potential for dis-
crimination as genomic research moves forward, actual instances of
genetic discrimination, and the continuing concerns of the populace,
Congress took a vital step in this important realm by passing the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act ("GINA") of 2008, which
was signed into law in the summer of 2008. The Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act advances civil rights by providing a consistent
national standard that would remedy the patchwork quilt of inade-
quate state laws, and fill gaps as well as clarify ambiguities in already
existing federal law. Thus, GINA enhances protection against genetic
discrimination in health insurance and employment, which in turn
should advance genetic research by assuaging concerns that genetic
information obtained in research might be discriminatorily used
against the subjects of genetic research.
II. BACKGROUND: THE GENETIC INFORMATION
NONDISCRIMINATION ACT OF 2008
Congress had made substantial attempts to pass comprehensive
legislation prohibiting genetic discrimination since the 103 rd
Congress.33 The first legislation introduced was the Human Genome
Privacy Act of 1990. 34 In the mid 1990's, there was a flurry of six
different bills proposed within a five month time period. Three of
these bills addressed the protection of individuals against genetic
discrimination, while the other three were proposed to improve health
CONGRESS, GENETIC TESTING: SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND AND NONDISCRIMINATION
LEGISLATION 24 (2005), available at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/05mar/
RL32478.pdf.
31 Id.
32 Id.
13 Id. at 1.
34 Bornstein, supra note 18, at 579.
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insurance portability and continuity while including restrictions on the
use of genetic information.35
Senator Daschle and Congresswoman Slaughter concurrently
introduced Senate Bill S.318 and House Bill H.R. 602 on February 13,
2001. The bill, called the "Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health
Insurance and Employment Act," would have amended ERISA, the
Public Health Service Act (PHSA) and the Internal Revenue Code
(IRC).36 This legislation is very similar to the current GINA in
regards to the insurance provisions. Insurers would have been prohib-
ited from: (1) discriminating in "individual enrollment"; (2) discrimi-
nating in "group eligibility or group premium or contribution rates";
(3) "requesting or requiring [genetic] test[s] . . . as a condition of
employment or insurance"; and (4) "requesting, requiring, collecting,
purchasing, or disclosing [genetic] information, unless authorized by
the individual. 37 These bills also incorporated definitions of genetic
testing and information very similar to GINA. However, S.318 and
H.R.602 did not prevail.
After S.318 and H.R. 602 failed passage in Congress, Senator
Snowe submitted the "Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2002. "38 This piece of legislation marked a departure from previous
bills, as it added prohibitions of genetic discrimination based upon the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 39 The other provisions of the legislation -
including definitions and federal law to be amended - remained pri-
marily the same as they appeared in the Daschle bill.40 As before, this
legislative initiative was not approved by both houses of Congress.
In the coming years, there would be many more attempts to pass
comprehensive nondiscrimination legislation. In 2003, the Senate
introduced S. 1053, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act,
which passed the Senate on October 14 by a vote of 95-0; however, its
identical companion in the House of Representatives, H.R. 1910, did
not come to a vote before the end of the legislative session.41 On Feb-
ruary 7, 2005, Senator Snowe introduced S. 306, the Genetic Informa-
tion Nondiscrimination Act of 2005. It was passed by the Senate by a
vote of 98-0. An identical bill, H.R. 1227, was introduced in the
" Id. at 579.
36 Jennifer S. Geetter, Coding for Change: The Power of the Human Genome
to Transform the American Health Insurance System, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 53-54
(2002).
37 Id. at 54 (citation omitted).
38 Id. at 55.
39 Id.
4 id.
41 SCHOONMAKER & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 1.
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House of Representatives by Representatives Biggert, Slaughter, Ney
and Eshoo on March 10, 2005, but it did not come to a vote.42 The
only change made by S. 306 was the deletion of one tax related provi-
sion from Section 103 of the legislation.
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2007 (GINA),
sponsored by Senator Olympia Snowe and Representative Louise
McIntosh Slaughter, and co-sponsored by 258 senators and represen-
tatives, passed the House with a vote of 420 to 3 on April 25, 2007,
and passed the Senate with a vote of 95 to 0 on April 24, 2008. 4 3 On
May 1, 2008, the GINA of 2008 was re-introduced in the House,
which passed it that same day, 414 to 1 on motion to suspend the rules
and agree to the resolution. Despite the repeated history of one cham-
ber passing it and the other chamber failing to do so, GINA of 2008
finally passed without amendment by Unanimous Consent in the
Senate. On May 21, 2008, President Bush signed H.R. 493, the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 into federal law.
Civil rights thus took a quantum leap into the 2 1st century!
Genetic nondiscrimination legislation such as GINA of 2008 had
the support of consumer groups, members of the medical profession,
researchers and the medical products industry. 44 These groups assev-
erated that prior laws were insufficient to protect individuals from
genetic discrimination. Without protection, these individuals will not
seek out genetic testing and preventative treatment for fear of reprisals
from employers and insurance companies.45 Opponents to genetic
nondiscrimination legislation included some members of the insur-
ance industry and the US Chamber of Commerce.4 6 The insurance
industry representatives argued that current laws provide sufficient
protection, and that new legislation would create confusing, unneces-
sary, expensive regulations as well as increased opportunity for litiga-
tion.47 Moreover, insurance companies claimed that GINA would be
unfair, prohibiting the use of genetic information when they already
use other health information. 4 Most opponents also pointed to how
few documented cases of genetic discrimination have been recorded,
42 id.
43 GovTrack.us, H.R. 493: Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h 110-493 (last visited Nov. 3,
2008).
44 SCHOONMAKER & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 1-2.
41 Id. at 24.
46 Id. at 2.
47 See id.
48 id.
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and claimed that GINA was an attempt to legislate based on fear
rather than practice.
Some supporters of GINA, however, argued that these fears of
genetic discrimination must be addressed. If the fears of genetic
discrimination are allayed, supporters believe that individuals will be
more apt to seek out health care service, participate in clinical re-
search, and benefit from the advances of the Human Genome
Project.49 With the technological advances in genetics, scientists are
continuing to decipher the sequence of the human genome and
develop tests to detect diseases and disorders. This endeavor cannot
be accomplished without the active participation of individuals who
are willing to undergo genetic testing and research. Furthermore, pub-
lic health will best be served if patients with genetic predispositions
can confidently pursue screening and preventative health care meas-
ures. The enactment of GINA, like preventative medicine, helps
prohibit discrimination and lift fears at the same time.
III. GENETIC DISCRIMINATION: EVIDENCE OF A
GROWING PROBLEM
A. Accounts of Genetic Discrimination
In the midst of what may seem to be impersonal and desiccated
statistics and reports, it is important to remember that behind every
number and incident, there are individuals who have undergone diffi-
cult situations brought on by genetic discrimination. Some of these
individuals provided testimony to the Secretary of Health and Human
Service's Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society on
October 18, 2004.50 Their narratives painted persuasive portraits for
the passage of GINA.
Heidi Williams and her two children were victims of genetic
discrimination in 2003. 51 When she applied for health insurance for
her children, she was asked whether her children had any pre-existing
conditions. "[U]nder a threat of a fine and incarceration for falsifying
49 Id.
50 The Agenda and testimony from the meeting is available at Nat'l Institutes
of Health, Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society,
http://www.webconferences.com/nihsacghs/18oct2004.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2008); SCHOONMAKER & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 25.
51 Heidi Williams, Testimony before the Secretary's Advisory Committee on
Genetics, Health, and Society (Oct. 18-19, 2004), http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/
SACGHS/meetings/October2004/transcriptWilliams trans.pdf (last visited Jan. 7,
2009).
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information" she told the insurance representative that her children are
carriers of the alpha-I antitrypsin deficiency, or AAT, a genetic liver
deficiency that can progressively affect the lungs, the liver, or both.52
However, being only carriers of the gene, they would not develop the
disease. Williams was denied coverage by the insurer twice, even
after submitting letters from the National Institutes of Health and the
Alpha-I Foundation affirming that her children would not develop the
disease. The treatment that Williams received from the insurance
company made her feel guilty, ashamed and angry:
We are all viable members of a community with contributions
to make and shouldn't have to be afraid that our genetic
anomalies, in whatever form they arise, will be held against
us. I should not have had to spend the better part of six
months wondering if the decision to have my children's
genetic status verified by their pediatrician was a huge
mistake. I should not have to wonder if my children's genetic
status is going to follow them into the workforce and render
them unable to become employed in their chosen fields. And
I certainly should not have to feel guilty for unknowingly
passing this genetic anomaly on to my children.53
For Phaedra Malatek and her two sons, genetic testing presents a
double-edged sword.5 4 In 1991, her father was diagnosed with hemo-
chromatosis - a commonly inherited genetic disorder which causes
iron overload in the blood - and subsequently passed away from the
damage caused to his liver and heart. Malatek, out of concern for the
well being of her children, wondered: "[I]f my children undergo ge-
netic testing for hemochromatosis, they risk not being able to obtain
health insurance when they're no longer covered under my husband's
policy and possible discrimination when they seek employment.,
55
Furthermore, Malatek explained that "[ilt's troubling to me that as
Americans we're placed in a position where we have to make such a
terrible choice. ' 56 At the time of her testimony, Malatek's sons still
had not been tested for hemochromatosis for fear of discrimination. 7
52 Id.
5 3 id.
54 Phaedra Malatek, Testimony before the Secretary's Advisory Committee
on Genetics, Health, and Society (Oct. 18-19, 2004), http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/
SACGHS/meetings/October2004/transcript/Malatekjtrans.pdf (last visited Jan. 7,
2009).
5 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
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After a genetic test revealed a positive result for BRCA1, Tonia
Phillips had to decide how to proceed with a 45% chance of develop-
ing breast cancer and an 80% chance of developing uterine cancer.
58
After undergoing a hysterectomy and a prophylactic double mastec-
tomy, the insurance rates in her four-person office rose by $13,000 per
person. Her boss asked her to switch to her husband's insurance
policy, even offering her a pay raise to do so. For Phillips, "[i]t seems
unfair to me that I am taking steps to keep myself healthy and to
prevent cancer in the future, and I am being singled out and made to
feel I am a liability."59 In the end, she did not switch insurance com-
panies, but the office now requires employees to pay half of their
insurance premiums.6°
Phil Hardt has two genetic disorders: hemophilia B and Hunting-
ton's Disease.61 Upon the diagnosis of Hardt's hemophilia in the
early 1990s, his HR director recommended that he not reveal his
disease to his boss; otherwise, he would be neither trained nor
promoted. He was denied credit insurance for his car purchase when
it was discovered that he had Huntington's Disease (HD). Hardt
described the affliction of HD as being "like living with Alzheimer's,
Parkinson's, MS, and going insane all at the same time." 62 However,
the effects of his genetic diseases reach farther than his own health.
His children and grandchildren are routinely denied life insurance
unless they are tested for HD and the test result is negative. His
grandchildren have been denied health insurance because of the
hemophilia and are left with an option: either earn very little money to
qualify for state welfare, or pay their own health costs. Hardt likened
the current state of genetic testing in the US to the Tiresias complex.
"If you remember, the blind seer Tiresias confronted Oedipus with the
dilemma, 'it is but sorrow to be wise when wisdom profits not.'
63
Although knowledge of genetic predispositions to disease opens the
door to preventative medicine, the results are devastating to individu-
als and family members.
58 Tonia Phillips, Testimony before the Secretary's Advisory Committee on
Genetics, Health, and Society (Oct. 18-19, 2004), http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/
SACGHS/meetings/October2004/transcript/Phillips-trans.pdf (last visited Jan. 9,
2009).
59 Id.
60 id.
61 See Phil Hardt, Testimony before the Secretary's Advisory Committee on
Genetics, Health, and Society (Oct. 18-19, 2004), http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/
SACGHS/meetings/October2004/transcript/Hardt trans.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2009).
62 Id.
63 Id.
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In one particularly well known example that transpired in October
of 2005, the Chicago Bulls requested that a player named Eddie Curry
receive genetic testing to diagnose a possible heart arrhythmia.
64
After becoming ill with lightheadedness and dizziness, he was diag-
nosed with an irregular heartbeat and benched for the rest of the sea-
son. The Bulls thought that Curry might have a predisposition to Hy-
pertrophic Cardiomyopathy (HCM), which had resulted in the early
demise of other NBA basketball players. HCM is a genetic disorder
that affects the heart, causing it to enlarge and weaken. Curry de-
clined the genetic testing on the basis of what he considered federal
constitutional grounds. The Bulls, in response, traded Curry to the
New York Knicks rather than mounting a legal challenge to Curry's
refusal under state and/or federal law.
The Knicks also declined to bring suit under New York's genetic
discrimination statute. In fact, New York state law, prohibiting
genetic testing as a condition of employment, prevented the Knicks
from requiring Curry's genetic information. 65 Instead, Curry sub-
mitted to various non-genetic physical examinations, which all estab-
lished Curry's then current condition of health. Moreover, the
Knicks' team doctor decided that a genetic test was not necessary
because DNA testing was still too new and inconclusive.
66
The insurance carrier for the NBA balked at indemnifying Curry's
contract due to his history of prior heart issues. The Knicks then
sought to find an alternative insurer. The New York franchise also
made Curry's contract partially contingent upon his health. The
Knicks would not retain liability for his full contract if Curry could
not play because of coronary difficulties. This case demonstrates not
only potential sources of genetic discrimination, but also the differing
levels of protection offered by the states' privacy and discrimination
laws, thus illustrating the benefit of GINA's laying a consistent floor
below the patchwork quilt of state laws.
Those who serve in the military also did not fird themselves
immune from the threat of genetic discrimination. Eric Miller, a 28
year old Army Ranger, suffered back pain during his tour in Afghani-
stan.67 It took three surgeries to remove the tumors in his back and
brain. A genetic test, however, discovered a genetic mutation which
facilitated uncontrollable tumor growth. Miller was discharged from
64 Andrew E. Rice, Eddy Curry and the Case for Genetic Privacy in Profes-
sional Sports, 6 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2006).
65 Id. at 7-8.
66 Id. at 7.
67 Karen Kaplan, US. Military Practices Genetic Discrimination in Denying
Benefits, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2007, at Al.
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the Army in 2005 because of his illness, with no disability benefits or
health insurance to help in his fight against cancer. For the last 20
years, it has been military policy to deny disability benefits to service
men and women for congenital disorders in an effort to prevent indi-
viduals from choosing a military career for the benefits.68 The rule
affords an exception if the individual has served more than eight years
in the military. It has been argued that some genetic discrimination is
necessary for the strength and efficacy of the military, such as refus-
ing to accept those who have achondroplasia (dwarfism), color blind-
ness, or hereditary hearing loss. However, refusing benefits goes
beyond mere selection of service men and women. As Kathy Hudson,
director of the Genetics and Public Policy Center at Johns Hopkins
University stated bluntly: "You could be in the military and be a six-
pack-a-day smoker, and if you come down with emphysema, 'That's
OK. We've got you covered.' ... But if you happen to have a disease
where there is an identified genetic contribution, you are screwed." 69
This practice is even causing military doctors to recommend that ser-
vice men and women not submit to genetic testing. By refusing
genetic tests, these individuals lose the chance to learn from poten-
tially life-saving diagnoses and treatments. Miller lost his case on
appeal and received no benefits or insurance.70
B. Applicable Case Law
At present, the US Federal or state courts have decided very few if
any genetic discrimination cases in the scope of either in employment
or health insurance.7' Most cases referring to genetic discrimination
concern the use of genetic information as evidence in criminal trials.
Those cases that have related to genetic discrimination focused either
on privacy law or interpretations of the ADA. There have not been
any published cases concerning genetic discrimination in health insur-
ance coverage. However, the dearth of current case law should not
lull one to dismiss the prophylactic value of GINA, where the law
does not lag as far behind technological and scientific advances than it
formerly did.
68 id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Paul Steven Miller, Analyzing Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, in
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE BIOTECH AGE 173, 176 (Sheldon Krimsky & Peter
Shorett eds., 2005).
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Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory72
Although not expressly concerning genetic discrimination, the
Norman-Bloodsaw case contributes to this debate because it concerns
an employer's invasions of privacy through medical examinations.
Genetic tests constitute a type of medical examination.
In its hiring process, the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory would
conditionally offer candidates employment subject to subsequent
medical exams. 73 The plaintiffs in this case, seven present and former
employees, accepted the condition of undergoing the medical exami-
nations, including blood and urine samples. In addition, the employ-
ees answered health information questionnaires, including questions
regarding sickle cell anemia (a genetically linked condition), venereal
disease, and female menstrual disorders. Without knowledge or
consent, African-American employees were tested for the sickle cell
trait, women were tested for pregnancy, and all were tested for syphi-
lis. Defendant employer stated that the tests were part of an overall
occupational health program (permissible under GINA, too), and
regardless, the questioned testing had been terminated as of 1995.
After the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' allegations, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the decision on appeal.
First, the Court reversed the District Court's dismissal on the
invasion of privacy claim.74 According to the Court, the plaintiffs'
constitutionally protected privacy rights were invaded by the medical
examinations. In invasion of privacy cases, "the most basic violation
possible involves the performance of unauthorized tests - that is, the
non-consensual retrieval of previously unrevealed medical informa-
tion that may be unknown even to plaintiffs. 75 Test results concern-
ing syphilis, pregnancy and the sickle cell trait contain information
which may invite social stigma, and reveal sensitive personal informa-
tion about family history and reproductive choices. With respect to
the testing for syphilis and pregnancy, the Ninth Circuit has estab-
lished "that the Constitution prohibits unregulated, unrestrained
employer inquiries into personal sexual matters that have no bearing
on job performance., 76 The court determined that answering a medi-
cal questionnaire or agreeing to undergo a medical examination for
72 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998).
71 Id. at 1264-66.
74 Id. at 1268-70.
" Id. at 1269.
76 Id. (citations omitted).
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employment in no way puts the employee on notice of the testing
conditions, nor does it provide the employer with consent.7 7
Second, the Circuit Court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs'
Title VII discrimination claims.78 In its reasoning, the Court relied on
Section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
prohibits discrimination against individuals with respect to terms and
conditions of employment based upon race, color or sex.79 It also
relied on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which defines "sex"
discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth or other related medical conditions.80 In this case, the plain-
tiffs' claim fell directly under the protection of Title VII because Afri-
can-American and female employees were singled out for additional
nonconsensual medical examinations. Because the medical examina-
tions were an explicit condition of employment, these additional tests
in effect created different terms and conditions of employment for the
plaintiffs than for other job applicants. Furthermore, the process of
obtaining such medical information based upon sex, color or race con-
stitutes a statutory "adverse effect" under Title VII.
81
The holding in Norman-Bloodsaw ipso facto would only protect
individuals from genetic discrimination so long as they are covered as
a protected group under Title VII, or the violations of privacy in
medical testing rise to the gravity of nonconsensual testing conducted
by the employer into the employee's sensitive personal information.
Yet, this holding is not broad enough to provide protection to all indi-
viduals who would bring forth a claim of genetic discrimination.
First, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the claim brought under the
ADA, because the ADA does not limit the scope of the medical
examinations made after a conditional offer of employment. These
examinations are not required to be solely job-related or consistent
with business necessity. The only requirement is that this information
must be kept confidential, and must not be used by the employer in
subsequent employment decisions. Thus, under this holding alone,
employers are still able to perform medical examinations designed to
discover the employee's genetic information. Second, the holding in
Norman-Bloodsaw only applies to protected groups; those who are not
part of protected groups, such as white males, for example, could still
be required to undergo nonconsensual genetic testing. The limitations
of the Norman-Bloodsaw case with respect to protection from genetic
77 Id.
78 Id. at 1271-73.
79 id.
so Id.
81 Id. at 1272.
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discrimination highlights the role that GINA performs in enhancing
protection.
Bragdon v. Abbott
2
Although the courts have not yet decided whether individuals with
presymptomatic genetic disorders or proclivities are protected by the
ADA (now they are clearly protected through GINA), the Supreme
Court held in Bragdon v. Abbott that individuals with asymptomatic
HIV are covered by the ADA. 3 An asymptomatic HIV individual,
Ms. Abbott, sought dental care from Dr. Bragdon. Dr. Bragdon
agreed to perform the routine dental exam.8 4 But when the exam
turned up a cavity, he explained that he would only fill cavities of
HIV-infected patients in hospitals.8 5 Although he did not charge extra
for the care, Ms. Abbott would have been responsible for hospital
fees. 6 She declined the dental care and sued Dr. Bragdon for
discrimination under the ADA. 87 The district court held in favor of
Ms. Abbott, and the circuit court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.88
The Supreme Court held that Ms. Abbott is disabled under the
ADA because asymptomatic HIV constitutes a physical impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of the
individual.89 The Supreme Court systematically reviewed the differ-
ent aspects of this protection.9" First, the court held that HIV meets
the statutory definition of disability because it is a "physiological
disorder with a constant and detrimental effect in the infected person's
hemic and lymphatic systems from the moment of infection." 9' Sec-
ond, the Supreme Court determined that reproduction constitutes a
major life activity under the ADA. 92 Third, HIV substantially limits
an individual's reproductive choices, as unprotected intercourse poses
a threat to the sexual partner and progeny.93 Since current anti-viral
medications can only reduce the risk of transmission of HIV by 8%,
82 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
" Id. at 647.
"4 Id. at 628-30.
85 id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 641-42.
90 Id. at 637-42.
91 Id. at 637.
92 Id. at 639.
93 Id. at 641.
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the risk of transmission is sufficient to prevent HIV-positive individu-
als from endangering those with whom they would engage in inter-
course.94 Furthermore, the Court stated that its findings are supported
by the many agency interpretations of the ADA statutes, as well as
administrative guidance.95
As some scholars have observed, this holding vastly expands the
existing ADA interpretations. First, the Supreme Court determined
that asymptomatic HIV qualified as a disability under the ADA,
although its effects of physical impairment are relatively minor in
comparison with other disabilities. Second, reproduction, although
important to many, is not the same type of major life activity as walk-
ing, talking, seeing, hearing or working. Third, the application of
protection under the ADA is intended to be determined upon inquiry
into individual cases. In this case, Ms. Abbott had no interest in hav-
ing children. Finally, the holding was not limited to Ms. Abbott;
rather, the Court left open whether HIV is universally a disability and
whether the holding includes women who are unable to reproduce
because of menopause or sterility.
96
By analogy, this case would provide protection for individuals
with genetic diseases under the ADA. However, it is unclear that the
precedent set by Bragdon v. Abott will provide protection for indi-
viduals with genetic predispositions to specific diseases. Those with
monogenetic predispositions with almost categorical expectations of
eventual disease onset, such as those with the gene for Huntington's
Disease, may find aegis under Bragdon's interpretation of the ADA.97
Those with less certain genetic predispositions face a heavy dual bur-
den of proof to qualify under the ADA. First, the individual will have
to prove that he or she "suffered from physical impairment" before the
symptoms occurred.98 This creates a heavy burden because most
genetic conditions first begin with the symptoms, and then are fol-
lowed by the impairment.99 Additionally, the individual must prove
that a major life activity has been limited.' 00 This is also a difficult
burden to meet because genetic transmission differs substantially from
HIV transmission. 101 Genetically predisposed parents cannot transmit
genetic disorders through sexual relations to a partner or through
94 Id. at 640-41; Geetter, supra note 36, at 40.
9' Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 642.
96 Id.; Geetter, supra note 36, at 40.
97 See Geetter, supra note 36, at 41; Silvers & Stein, supra note 15, at 1365.
98 Geetter, supra note 36, at 42.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 See id.
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labor. Even if the child actually inherits the unfortunate genetic
sequence, it remains uncertain whether the child will even develop the
disease. Genetically presymptomatic individuals could also bring suit
under the "regarded as" prong of the ADA. 10 2 The individual must be
able to demonstrate that either he or she had a physical or mental
impairment that does not substantially limit the ability to perform
major life activities, or that he or she did not suffer from an impair-
ment listed as a disability under the ADA.10 3 Yet neither of these
possibilities will cover all genetic discrimination claims.
There is another important concern that Jennifer Geetter points
out in her research concerning the difference between HIV transmis-
sion and genetic transmission. With our nation's history of eugenics,
it is important not to attach stigmas to certain genotypes or pheno-
types. In effect, "[b]y considering someone disabled because she may
pass along a genotype that departs in one way from the healthy norm,
we have created something akin to benign eugenics."'' °4 It is inadvis-
able to create a legal standard that some people are limited in their
ability to have children because of genotype or phenotype, as most of
our states did earlier in our history.
Moreover, this holding has been criticized as overly broad. In the
dissent, Justices Scalia, Thomas and Rehnquist noted that this holding
"taken to its logical extreme, would render every individual with a
genetic marker for some debilitating disease 'disabled' here and now
because of some possible future effects."' 10 5 The preamble to the
ADA indicated that 43 million Americans had some form of physical
or mental disability. 10 6 The majority in this case determined that this
decision would expand coverage to 160 million Americans. It has
been posited that the "43 million" statistic demonstrates legislative
intent to protect a limited group of individuals. 10 7 Furthermore, an
expansion of the ADA's coverage to genetically predisposed indi-
viduals would effectively cause all Americans to be protected under
the ADA "because all [individuals] . ..have identifiable genetic
abnormalities."' 0 8 This would stretch the ADA beyond its original
goal and, by protecting all Americans, it would effectively protect no
102 Id. at 43.
103 Id.
'04 Id. at 42.
105 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 661 (1998) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
106 Geetter, supra note 36, at 41; Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of
1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2007) (this section contains the Congressional findings and
purposes for enacting the ADA).
107 Geetter, supra note 36, at 41.
108 Id.
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one. Put another way, a genetic defect does not necessarily constitute
a disability. Thus, Bragdon and the ADA might not be the best possi-
ble vehicle to protect individuals from genetic discrimination. GINA
has more sensibly done so.
EEOC v. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway'0 9
In 2001, EEOC v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway came
closest to establishing court precedent for genetic nondiscrimination
in employment. It constituted the first case involving a claim of
genetic discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway (BNSF) required
union employees who claimed to suffer from carpal tunnel syndrome
(CTS) to undergo blood tests. BNSF then used these blood samples to
conduct genetic testing for CTS predisposition without the express
consent of the employees. At least one employee complained that
BNSF threatened to fire him if he refused the blood test." "CTS is a
painful hand and wrist condition often caused by repetitive
motion."11' Determining whether the injury was caused by a predis-
position to CTS necessitated the testing, according to BNSF. 12 The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the
affected labor union responded by filing lawsuits. The lawsuit was
settled in 2002 for $2.2 million before it went to trial, possibly due to
the publicity surrounding it. 113 BSNF eliminated the genetic testing
program as a condition of the settlement. 114  Although the early
settlement meant that the courts could not evaluate the legal principles
involved in a genetic discrimination case,' 15 the idea of allowing non-
consensual genetic testing for employees did not find outspoken
support. 116
This case came as the EEOC's first concerning genetic discrimi-
nation. In a statement to the press, EEOC Commissioner Paul Steven
Miller averred that discriminatory employment practices based on
genetic testing violated the ADA. Although employers are permitted
to require employees to undergo medical examinations provided that
'09 No. CO 1-4013 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 9, 2001).
110 Silvers & Stein, supra note 15, at 1350.
... SCHOONMAKER & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 22.
112 Id.
113 Joanne L. Hustead & Janlori Goldman, Genetics and Privacy, 28 AM. J.L.
& MED. 285, 295 & n.55 (2002); SCHOONMAKER & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 22.
"14 Hustead & Goldman, supra note 113, at 295 n.55.
115 Id. at 295.
116 Miller, supra note 71, at 176-177.
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they are sufficiently work-related, "[a]ny test which purports to pre-
dict future disabilities, whether or not it is accurate, is unlikely to be
relevant to the employee's present ability to perform his or her job."'1 17
However, the complexity of the ADA itself poses one of the main
difficulties facing the prohibition of discriminatory use of medical
testing. Provisions that allow for differential treatment of prospective
and existing employees, as well as the difficulties in defining the con-
cept of "disability," make it hard for courts and employers to deter-
mine the precise contours of the ADA protections." 8
A similar case was filed by the EEOC in 2001 against
Woodbridge Corporation concerning the screening of nineteen job
applicants for CTS. 119 This case is the only recorded federal decision
deciding a genetic discrimination claim on the merits.' 20 These appli-
cants were tested for abnormal wrist neurometric readings in order to
determine whether the applicant would be predisposed to developing
CTS. The EEOC argued that Woodbridge used the tests to discrimi-
nate against the nineteen applicants because of a perceived disability
that would substantially limit their ability to work.' 21 Woodbridge
responded that the testing was specifically designed and required for
the repetitive motion necessary for a specific foam line in the one
plant in Kansas City.
122
The district court granted summary judgment to Woodbridge,
holding that the employee's argument failed to satisfy the "regarded
as" prong of the ADA. 123 The circuit court affirmed the decision on
appeal. In order to prevail, the employer must have regarded the em-
ployee as disabled under the ADA, which means "significantly
restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad
range ofjobs in various classes as compared to the average person.' 24
The plaintiffs were unable to meet these requirements, especially con-
117 Press Release, Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC Petitions
Court to Ban Genetic Testing of Railroad Workers in First EEOC Case Challenging
Genetic Testing Under Americans with Disabilities Act (Feb. 9, 2001), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/press/2-9-01-c.html.
118 Hustead & Goldman, supra note 113, at 295.
119 Equal Emp. Opp. Comm'n v. Woodbridge Corp., 263 F.3d 812 (8th Cir.
2001).
120 Silvers & Stein, supra note 15, at 1363-64 (discussing that "only a handful
of cases clearly charging genetic discrimination have been filed by the EEOC.").
121 Woodbridge Corp., 263 F.3d at 813-14.
122 id.
123 Silvers & Stein, supra note 15, at 1373 (providing background information
on the Woodbridge case).
124 Woodbridge Corp., 263 F.3d at 815 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i)
(1991)).
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sidering that Woodbridge hired some of the nineteen applicants for
other positions in the corporation and the limited nature of the testing.
Despite this case's similarity to the recently settled EEOC v. Burling-
ton Northern and Santa Fe Railway case, the court did not find that
this situation qualified as a discriminatory hiring practice.1 25
Cases effectively limiting the protections available under the ADA
Despite the broad holding in Bragdon v. Abbott and the recent
EEOC victory against genetic testing in EEOC v. Burlington Northern
and Santa Fe Railway, the most recent Supreme Court cases interpret-
ing the ADA have tended to limit, rather than expand, the application
of the ADA.
In a recent trio of decisions, the Supreme Court has limited the
interpretation of disability under the ADA. In Sutton v. United Air-
lines, Inc., twin sisters with severe myopia were denied employment
as airline pilots because their uncorrected vision did not meet com-
pany standards. 126 In interpreting the ADA, the Court refused to
employ the EEOC guidelines that directed people to be judged in their
uncorrected state. Rather, employers must judge prospective or cur-
rent employees by their condition together with mitigating factors. If
an individual has an impairment that can be fully corrected by medi-
cation or other measures, then that individual cannot be said to be
substantially limited in a major life activity. 127 Furthermore, the Court
looked to the report prepared by the National Council on Disability,
which the Council wrote to play a pivotal role in the creation of the
ADA. This study stated that an overinclusive estimate of 160 million
people with a disability would encompass people with all conditions
that affect health or normal functions, and an underinclusive estimate
of 22.7 million would consider only those with work-related disabili-
ties. Instead, the 43 million number demonstrates an intent to limit
the applicability of the ADA to those who meet a stricter definition of
disability. 28 Thus, those who are able to mitigate their impairments
to the point of being able to function normally would not be consid-
ered disabled.
In the second part of its analysis, the Court in Sutton also held that
the myopic sisters did not meet the definition of being "regarded as
disabled," since it requires that the employer mistakenly believe that
the individual actually has a limiting disability, or mistakenly believe
125 Silvers & Stein, supra note 15, at 1373-74.
126 Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475-76 (1999).
127 Id. at 482-83.
128 Id. at 487.
HEALTH MA TRIX
that the actual impairment substantially limits one or more major life
activities. 129 Or, more specifically, "an employer has to believe that
the individual is ecumenically disabled-that she cannot perform an
entire range of jobs in addition to the one from which she claims she
has been unjustly excluded."' 130 In this case, the myopic twins were
excluded from one type of employment only - global airline pilot -
but would have been able to qualify as a co-pilot or pilot for a courier
service. 131 Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of both
plaintiffs' claims.
These holdings guided the decisions in two other cases. In
Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., UPS dismissed the plaintiff
Murphy from his job as a mechanic. The job required driving com-
mercial vehicles; his high blood pressure would prevent him from
receiving the necessary Department of Transportation certification.
Although high blood pressure constitutes a medical condition, medi-
cine can diminish it. Murphy was a qualified mechanic and high
blood pressure did not exclude him from a broad array of jobs, but it
did exclude him from jobs that would require driving commercial
vehicles. 132 Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg involved the firing of an
employee from his position as truck driver because of monocular
vision problems. Although the Department of Transportation estab-
lished an experimental waiver program, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that an employer does not violate the ADA by enforcing the
standard statutory requirements for commercial trucking vision
requirements.
133
This trio of cases limits the interpretation of the ADA in two
major ways. First, the Supreme Court held in Sutton that mitigating
factors must be taken into account when determining the existence of
a "disability." Second, and more importantly for the genetic informa-
tion nondiscrimination debate, the Supreme Court indicated in Sutton
and Albertson's that it would not always extend to the EEOC guide-
lines the deference traditionally granted to federal regulatory agencies.
Depending upon judicial interpretation and analysis, courts may or
may not decide to extend deference to the EEOC's regulations con-
ceming genetic discrimination protection under the ADA in future
decisions. 34 GINA decisively fills the gap not covered by the ADA.
129 Id. at 489.
130 Silvers & Stein, supra note 15, at 1372.
131 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 493.
132 Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
33 Albertson's, Inc v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
134 Silvers & Stein, supra note 15, at 1365-66.
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However, in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, the Supreme
Court expanded the affirmative defense of "direct threat" available to
employers under the ADA by adopting an EEOC regulation. Echaza-
bal worked for independent contractors at a Chevron-operated refinery
and had twice applied to work directly for Chevron. Each time, post-
offer conditional medical exams revealed a liver abnormality, which
later was diagnosed as Hepatitis C. Echazabal was refused employ-
ment because the condition would be aggravated by exposure to tox-
ins at the refinery. Additionally, Chevron asked the independent con-
tractors to reassign Echazabal to a job without exposure to harmful
chemicals or remove him from the refinery position. After Echazabal
was laid off by the independent contractors, he sued Chevron for vio-
lating the ADA. 135 Chevron defended its decision under an EEOC
regulation that permitted the employer an affirmative defense if the
worker's disability posed a direct threat to his or her own health or the
health of others.
When the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Chevron, Echazabal appealed. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding
that the employer erred in its interpretation of "direct threat" by
including threats to the individual himself in the scope of the
defense. 136 This created a circuit split with the Eleventh Circuit, and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Unanimously, the Supreme Court held that the "direct threat" af-
firmative defense included consideration of whether the disability
would pose a threat to the individual's own health. "Direct threat"
must be demonstrated by "reasonable medical judgment," an "indi-
vidualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely per-
form the essential functions of the job," and a consideration of "the
imminence of the risk and the severity of the harm portended." 137 The
Court did not, however, explain the specific standards for the applica-
tion of the newly expanded "direct threat" defense. Nor did the Court
determine whether Chevron correctly applied the defense; rather, it
remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings.
138
Given the unanimous acceptance of this decision, perhaps the
holding could extend to individuals with genetic conditions. Employ-
ers would be permitted to decide whether the genetic condition of an
employee would currently, or in the near future, be aggravated and
pose a direct threat to the employee's health. 139 GINA defuses the
"' Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76 (2002).
136 Id. at 77-78.
137 Id. at 86.
138 Silvers & Stein, supra note 15, at 1369.
139 Id.
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threat of the "direct threat" affirmative defense of the ADA by afford-
ing protection that the ADA does not.
IV. STATE LEGISLATION
Given the inadequacies of federal protection against genetic non-
discrimination, states have largely governed the realm of genetic dis-
crimination. This state of affairs sharply contrasts the virtual federal
monopoly over other forms of discrimination. Prior to 1986, state
laws addressing genetic discrimination were less prevalent and very
limited in scope. 140  However, following the development of the
Human Genome Project and increased academic and media attention,
state protection of genetic information has greatly expanded and
changed in both the health insurance and employment contexts.' 4' As
of the fall of 2006, forty-nine states have some form of law that
protects the misuse of genetic information - Pennsylvania alone lacks
such legislation. 1
42
A. Predominant State Approaches to Genetic Information
Currently, there are two predominant approaches for the protec-
tion of genetic information: protection based on property law, or pro-
tection based on privacy law. The majority of states justify protection
on privacy grounds, equating genetic information to other sensitive
medical information that is currently protected. A small minority of
states - including Colorado, Georgia and Louisiana - protect genetic
information as property. 43  The Colorado statute states: "Genetic
information is the unique property of the individual to whom the in-
formation pertains."' 144 The adoption of the property model, as stated
by scholars like Weeden, "would allow these states the future flexibil-
ity to better regulate even the possession of someone else's genetic
information, an option not available under a privacy regime.'0 45
Moreover, a third approach to handling genetic information that
emerges from state legislation is to employ direct nondiscrimination
laws. Currently, the nondiscrimination approach appears to be the
140 Bomstein, supra note 18, at 588.
141 Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We
Need Special Genetics Legislation?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 669, 690 (2001); Bornstein,
supra note 18, at 589.
142 Jeffery Lawrence Weeden, Genetic Liberty, Genetic Property: Protecting
Genetic Information, 4 AvE MARIA L. REv. 611, 632 (2006).
141 Id. at 633.
144 COLO. REv. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(a) (2008).
145 Weeden, supra note 142, at 633.
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most common among states, as forty-six states prohibit health insurers
from genetic discrimination and twenty-eight states prohibit employ-
ers from doing so.
146
B. State Laws Concerning Health Insurance
State statutes governing the use of genetic information in health
insurance have shifted from very limited protection against unfair
trade practices to "more intrusive regulation imposing restrictions on
insurance practices for the purpose of advancing social goals."'
147
Initially, state laws were aimed at preventing insurance companies
from discriminating against individuals absent an actuarial finding
serving as the basis for discrimination. Current laws protecting
genetic information prevent insurance companies from discriminating
despite actuarial genetic differences, thus barring use of genetic
information even if it is relevant to assessing risk.148 Laws relating to
use of genetic information by insurance companies have also
expanded from applying only to specific genetic tests to broader legis-
lation that forbids the use of genetic information regardless of the
source. 149
The protections afforded by state law vary widely from state to
state. Broadly speaking, state laws largely separate themselves into
three categories of progressively increasing protection: (1) trait pro-
tection; (2) prohibition of discrimination from the results of genetic
testing; and (3) forbidding discrimination in regards to genetic infor-
mation. Trait protection seeks to prevent discrimination based on
particular, genetically related traits. The first state to afford such pro-
tection was North Carolina in 1975. States that prohibit discrimina-
tion based on the results of genetic testing, such as Texas, afford a
higher level of protection. States such as New York provide protec-
tion in the highest category among states, forbidding discrimination
relating to genetic information, which may or may not have been
obtained through the genetic tests referred to in level two protections.
Even the highest two levels of state protection do not address the issue
of the collection of genetic information. GINA does address the col-
lection of genetic information, and thereby provides greater protection
than all three general categories of state law.
146 Suter, supra note 141, at 692.
147 John V. Jacobi, Genetic Discrimination in a Time of False Hopes, 30 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 363, 373 (2003); Geetter, supra note 36, at 51-52.
148 Jacobi, supra note 147, at 375.
149 Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insur-
ance, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 73, 99 (2005).
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Some of the more comprehensive legislative protections have
been passed in states like California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois,
Maryland, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode
Island and Tennessee.150 In California, for example, both individual
and group insurance policies are subject to the laws prohibiting
genetic discrimination. 151 Residents benefit from a generous defini-
tion of "[g]enetic characteristics," which includes "[a]ny scientifically
or medically identifiable gene or chromosome, or combination or
alteration thereof' and "[i]nherited characteristics that may derive
from the individual or family member . . . that are determined to be
associated with a statistically increased risk of development of a dis-
ease or disorder, and that are presently not associated with any symp-
toms of any disease or disorder."' 5 2 California is also one of a minor-
ity of states that provides relatively comprehensive protection against
genetic discrimination, as it prohibits establishing rules for eligibility
based on genetic information, requiring genetic tests, using genetic
information for selection and risk classification, and disclosing infor-
mation without informed consent. 53 At present, there are only two
states that do not provide some form of statutory protection against
genetic discrimination in health insurance: Pennsylvania and
Mississippi.
54
There are several observable trends in these state laws. 155 First,
all of the prohibitions generally do two things: "define the types of
information ... regulated" and "proscribe how [the] regulated infor-
mation can be used."'156 "Several states try to distinguish between
genetic and non-genetic information" by how they define "genetic
information."'157 Other states attempt to define "genetic characteris-
tics.' 58 These definitions vary greatly among states. Second, states
also vary in their prohibitions regarding the use of genetic informa-
tion. For instance, "[s]everal states prohibit the use of a patient's
genetic information outside of the therapeutic, research or investiga-
150 National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), State Genetic Dis-
crimination in Health Insurance Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/
ndishlth.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2008).
15i CAL. INS. CODE §§ 742.405, 10123.3 (West 2007).
152 § 10123.3(d)(1)-(2).
153 NCSL, State Genetic Discrimination in Health Insurance Laws, supra note
150.
154 id.
155 Geetter, supra note 36, at 52.
156 Id
157 Id.
158 Id.
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tory context."' 59 Other states "prohibit an insurer from denying issu-
ance or renewal based on genetic test results," while still "other states
.. . prohibit insurers from determining premiums based on genetic
traits. ' ' 6°  Third, however, all state statutes governing the use of
genetic information by insurance companies are missing one impor-
tant component. These statutes "offer no protection to people who are
symptomatic for genetically caused disorders.'' Consequently, a
person with a family history of breast cancer may not be discriminated
against, but a person who has had breast cancer may be charged
expensive premiums or even denied health insurance.
C. State Laws Concerning Employment Discrimination
Legislation governing the use of genetic information by employ-
ers also varies substantially. Compared to the state protections
afforded in the health insurance sector, there are fewer provided in
employment. Currently, only thirty-five states provide some form of
genetic nondiscrimination law in the employment context. 162 Those
laws that currently exist "prohibit discrimination based on the results
of genetic tests" and "[s]ome [laws] prohibit employers from both
obtaining and using genetic information for employment deci-
sions. ' ' 63 Some states' protections extend more comprehensively than
others. For example, only Minnesota, Oklahoma and South Dakota
provide protections across the board in employment, including prohib-
iting the employer from requesting genetic tests, requiring genetic
tests, performing genetic tests or obtaining genetic testing results.
1 64
Minnesota's law on genetic testing in employment is brief but com-
plete. 65 It provides a complete definition of genetic testing, which
includes "analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or
certain metabolites in order to detect disease-related genotypes or
mutations [and] [t]ests for metabolites . . . when an excess or defi-
ciency of the metabolites indicates the presence of a mutation or mu-
tations."1 66  Employers are prohibited from requesting, requiring,
using or collecting genetic information. However, substantial loop-
... Id. at 53.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), State Genetics
Employment Laws,http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndiscrim.htm (last
visited Oct. 29, 2008).
163 Suter, supra note 141, at 693 (footnote omitted).
164 NCSL, State Genetics Employment Laws, supra note 162.
165 MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 181.974 (West 2006).
166 Id.
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holes remain even in a statute as far-reaching as Minnesota's: protec-
tion does not extend to independent contractors and the only penalties
available come through civil actions, which place the burden on the
aggrieved employee to prove discrimination.
167
D. GINA: Providing a Unifying National Standard
without Uniformity
Despite the prevalence of state legislation, the myriad of statutes
and protections available resemble a hole-riddled patchwork quilt.
Each state provides its own mix of nondiscrimination statutes in
regards to health insurance, employment, privacy and property rights
and substantial differences remain across state lines. Since genetic
information in both the employment and insurance contexts frequently
traverses interstate lines, if not for GINA, conflicting state laws would
have continued to present challenges for both individuals seeking pro-
tection and governments enforcing provisions. 68 For example, con-
sider an individual who lives in Pennsylvania, who commutes to New
York to work, receives medical treatment in New Jersey, and whose
insurance company has its corporate headquarters in Delaware. The
choice of law questions would become exceedingly complex and their
outcome would be important for the individual. In fact, this scenario
puts a double burden on the individual: first, to establish which juris-
diction's laws apply, and second, to meet the appropriate burden of
proof. Another example would be that of Eddy Curry, the NBA
basketball player discussed above who would have been required by
the Chicago Bulls to undergo genetic testing, but not by the New York
Knicks based on different state laws. The varying state protections
also created unfair differences in the treatment of individuals. The
myriad of state legislation elicited the concern of GINA's authors,
who stated that there is "substantial evidence that the American public
and the medical community find the existing patchwork of State and
Federal laws to be confusing and inadequate to protect them from
discrimination.'
' 69
GINA's enactment directly addresses these problems by providing
a national standard of genetic nondiscrimination protection. GINA's
provisions are applied to states through preemption. Thus, the
amendments brought to existing federal law - such as ERISA, SSA
and HAS - continue to preempt state law. New privacy and confiden-
167 id.
168 Weeden, supra note 142, at 633.; 43 Am. Bus. L.J. 79, 137 (2006).
169 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233,
§ 2, 122 Stat. 881, 882 (2008).
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tiality sections effectively "supersede any contrary provision of State
law unless such provision . . . imposes requirements, standards, or
implementation specifications that are more stringent than [those]
imposed under" GINA.170 The employment provisions of GINA are
enforced through preexisting legislation that applies to private, fed-
eral, state and local employees.' 7' From the time GINA became law,
the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of
Labor has had one year to promulgate appropriate regulations to assist
with interpretation, coordination and enforcement. GINA will go into
full effect 12 months after it was signed into law.' 72 Through preemp-
tion, it is possible for the federal government to create a unifying
national floor for genetic information, without requiring uniformity, as
long as the state law in question meets or exceeds the standard set in
GINA.
V. PREVENTING GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
IN HEALTH INSURANCE
A. Current Protections Against Discrimination in Health Insurance
Before GINA, Americans derived protection from genetic dis-
crimination by a veritable alphabet soup of legislation: ERISA,
PHSA, SSA, and HIPAA. For the majority of Americans covered by
government programs or medium-to-large employers (20+ employ-
ees), federal law requires that coverage be issued to everyone who is
eligible and that rates are the same across the board. This accounts for
roughly 80% of the people in the US. 173 Recipients of health insur-
ance from smaller employers find themselves at risk because of the
smaller pool of beneficiaries (roughly 15% of people with private
insurance). 174 People who purchase their own health insurance poli-
cies experience the greatest risk. They undergo the greatest scrutiny
for health records, coverage and rates (about 10% of people with pri-
vate insurance). 75 These federal laws only provide some form of
protection against discrimination for some people some of the time.
170 S. 358, 110th Cong. § 104 (2007).
171 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act §§ 201-13.
172 § 101, 122 Stat. at 888.
173 MARK A. HALL, NORTH CAROLINA GENOMICS BIoNFoRMAnICs
CONSORTIUM, GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 3 (2001), available at
http://www.ncbiotech.org/services -andprgrams/genomics-consortium/consortium-
projects and events/geneticdiscrimination.pdf.
f/4 Id.
175 Id.
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1. ERISA, PHSA and SSA: Protections for Governmental and
Group Health Insurance Plans
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
federally preempts state law in regards to employer-provided health
insurance benefits. Currently, ERISA prohibits group health plans
and health insurance issuers from discriminating against participants
and beneficiaries based on the individual's genetic information.
ERISA's nondiscrimination provisions apply to eligibility for enroll-
ment as well as group premiums.
176
The Public Health Service Act (PHSA) governs both the group
and individual insurance market. With the exception of the enforce-
ment provisions, PHSA provisions concerning the group insurance
market trace those contained in ERISA legislation. As such, the
PHSA prohibits discrimination based upon genetic information in the
group health insurance market. GINA brings identical amendments to
the PHSA as in ERISA in regards to enrollment and premium nondis-
crimination, as well as genetic testing limitations.
177
Title XVII of the Social Security Act (SSA) governs Medigap
insurance coverage. Individuals who qualify for Medicare may pur-
chase supplemental health insurance to cover the "gap" between costs
covered by Medicare and the remaining balance. This supplemental
private insurance presently remains under state law. GINA's amend-
ments to the SSA create a basic standard of nondiscrimination poli-
cies. States that provide lesser protection are required to meet this
floor in order to prevent preemption.
2. HIPAA: Providing for Coverage, Privacy and Confidentiality
Genetic information nondiscrimination provisions are already pre-
sent in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA). 178 HIPAA, signed into law in 1996, took effect on April
14, 2001. This act both governs the portability of group health insur-
ance coverage for employees who transfer jobs, and safeguards the
privacy and confidentiality of protected health information (PHI).
HIPAA does not define the term "genetic information." However, the
Department of Health and Human Services determined that genetic
information, as it applies to HIPAA, includes "genes, gene products,
and inherited characteristics that may derive from the individual or a
176 S. REP. No. 110-48, at 2 (2007).
177 Id. at 24.
178 Jacobi, supra note 147, at 372.
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family member." 179 This definition also includes carrier status, infor-
mation from laboratory tests that identify genetic and chromosomal
mutations, physical examinations, family history and direct genetic
and chromosomal analysis.
3. Group Health Insurance
HIPAA regulations insure the "portability" of health care cover-
age for employees who change jobs. Group health plans, for example,
must limit periods of exclusion from coverage for preexisting condi-
tions (usually twelve months). This provision functions to permit
workers to change jobs without fear of losing their health coverage
due to ongoing conditions.80
Health insurance issuers may not consider genetic information in
coverage limitations and in the determination of membership eligibil-
ity because genetic predisposition to a disease does not count as a
preexisting condition.' 8 1 Yet, this does not guarantee that the issuer is
prohibited from genetic discrimination. Issuers may exclude the cov-
erage of certain diseases as long as the exclusion applies equally to the
entire insured group.
182
In the determination of group eligibility, insurers must have uni-
form eligibility rules for the plan members. HIPAA prevents issuers
from establishing groups of high-risk individuals based on health
information and from considering genetic predispositions as preexist-
ing conditions. So long as similarly situated individuals receive uni-
form treatment, these eligibility rules do not prevent the issuer from
restricting the amounts of benefits or eliminating coverage for certain
medical conditions. In effect, HIPAA does not guarantee a mandatory
minimum coverage or benefits package. Thus, an issuer may cap
benefits or coverage for genetically identifiable diseases so long as the
cap applies uniformly across the entire group.1
8 3
HIPAA provisions relating to the setting of premium rates also
prohibit discrimination between members of the same group.'8
4
Members may not have variable premiums based upon their individ-
179 Requirements Relating to Health Insurance Coverage, 45 C.F.R. § 144.103
(2007).
180 Jacobi, supra note 147, at 372.
181 See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(b) (2007); Crossley, supra note 149, at 100.
182 Robert F. Rich & Julian Ziegler, Genetic Discrimination in Health Insur-
ance - Comprehensive Legal Solutions for a (Not So) Special Problem?, 2 IND.
HEALTH L. REv. 1, 31 (2005).
183 Id. at 30-31; Crossley, supra note 149, at 115.
18 Crossley, supra note 149, at 100.
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ual health status. Department of Health and Human Services regula-
tions pertaining to HIPAA expressly prohibit the use of list-billing,
which is the use of individualized premium rates deducted from
employee payrolls and paid to the insurance company by the employer
through a single bill. This practice particularly shields small groups
of fewer than twenty-five employees and prevents the use of genetic
information to determine individual premium rates. 85 However, it
fails to prevent insurers from charging an elevated premium to the
entire group. Before GINA, it thus was possible for issuers to recu-
perate the costs from one individual by applying a higher premium
rate to the entire group. Small group insurance plans would find this
practice particularly burdensome since they may not have the capacity
to absorb the increased costs. As a result, these plans might cancel
coverage entirely.1
86
4. Individual Health Insurance
Concerning individual eligibility, workers with a sufficiently long
period of continuous coverage will receive continued coverage and a
guaranteed renewal from insurance issuers. Insurance issuers cannot
legally use genetic information to avoid these requirements.187 They
must offer eligible individuals coverage and allow them to enroll in
plans marketed on the individual health insurance market. 188 Fur-
thermore, the insurance issuers have to renew the individual health
insurance policies and genetic information may not be taken into ac-
count in the decision. However, the issuer may alter the coverage and
benefits based on genetic information, so long as the changes
uniformly apply to all individuals in the same policy and the changes
comply with state law.
189
Despite protections for eligibility and enrollment, HIPAA regula-
tions do not constrain insurance issuers from setting premiums for
eligible individuals. HIPAA also does not prohibit health plans or
issuers from requesting, requiring or compiling genetic information.
Issuers may base premium rates for insurance on the individual risk,
and may take into account the genetic information provided by the
individual. However, states have the discretion to regulate the
premium determination policies. GINA compensates for HIPAA's
deficiencies.
185 Rich & Ziegler, supra note 182, at 32.
186 Id.
187 Jacobi, supra note 147, at 373.
188 Rich & Ziegler, supra note 182, at 34-35.
"9 Id. at 37.
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5. Privacy and Confidentiality
The HIPAA privacy and confidentiality laws constitute the first
federal laws to protect health information within the context of health
care providers and health insurance plans. HIPAA does not com-
pletely preempt state privacy laws. Rather, it creates "a federal floor
of privacy protections." It preempts state law to the extent necessary
to meet the federal floor requirement. HIPAA does not change state
law that provides greater privacy protections to its citizens. 190
HIPAA legislation covers three main types of health care entities:
1. health care providers who transmit health information elec-
tronically using a standard format (health care providers
consist of doctors, hospitals, clinics, pharmacists and labo-
ratories);
2. health plans, including private insurers, employer-sponsored
health insurance, HMOs and government-sponsored health
insurance programs; and
3. health care clearinghouses that process information that is
transmitted between health plans and health care provid-
ers.
19 1
For genetic information to qualify for privacy and confidentiality
protection, it must meet the definition of "protected health informa-
tion" (PHI). 192 PHI is individually identifiable health information that
may be transmitted or maintained electronically or in any other form
or medium. This definition excludes employment records held by
health care providers, health plans or health care clearinghouses, when
acting in the role of employer. 193 In order to disclose PHI to other
parties, the covered entity must first obtain the patient's consent.
HIPAA shields information derived from genetic tests, services
and counseling, as well as family history. Health care providers that
provide general medical services, as well as specialists, should com-
ply with HIPAA regulations if they maintain and transmit health in-
formation electronically in standard, claims-type format. Thus, ge-
netic information compiled in research programs might remain outside
the aegis of HIPAA, depending on whether the researcher also func-
tions as a health care provider and whether the researcher bills insur-
ance companies for health care services.'
94
190 Hustead & Goldman, supra note 113, at 292-293.
191 Id. at 289.
192 Id.
193 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2007).
194 Hustead & Goldman, supra note 113, at 289-90.
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HIPAA protects workers by limiting disclosures of PHI, including
genetic information, by group health plans to insurers and employers.
HIPAA provisions attempt to prevent disclosures to employers and to
prohibit the inappropriate use of PHI by employers. For example,
group health plans and insurers may share PHI with employers only if
the information cannot be used for employment-related purposes and
even then only those employees involved in plan administration have
access. Another complicated situation arises when the employer pro-
vides health care services. If the information gathered is stored in the
claim-type format and maintained in electronic format, HIPAA regu-
lations apply. Nonetheless, it remains difficult to limit the flow of all
information once the employer has set up the health plan.
95
6. Loopholes in HIPAA Protections
HIPAA's provisions do leave substantial loopholes that would
allow group health plans and insurance issuers to discriminate against
people because of their genetics. These loopholes leave open the pos-
sibility for breaches of confidentiality and privacy, as well as permit
discrimination in eligibility and enrollment. They include the
following:
" HIPAA does not cover all entities that may come in contact
with genetic information. For example, pharmaceutical
companies, workers' compensation insurers, employers and
researchers - entities that may not always receive the ge-
netic information in the electronic, claims-type format that
would cause it to become protected health information
(PHI). 196
* No statutorily established private right of action exists for
people whose privacy rights have been violated.1
97
* Insurers in group markets may charge an entire group
higher premiums, or even refuse to cover entire groups be-
cause of the genetic information of one individual.'98
* Insurers may request, require, purchase and collect genetic
information about applicants in both the group and individ-
ual insurance markets.'
99
" Insurers in the individual market may deny coverage be-
cause of genetic information if the applicant does not meet
' Id. at 291.
'96 See id. at 288.
'9' Id. at 291-92.
'98 Id. at 292.
199 Id.; See Crossley, supra note 149, at 100.
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the requirements for HIPAA protection, may consider ge-
netic predisposition as a preexisting condition, and may set
premiums based upon genetic information.20 °
0 Even if employers receive genetic information through
health plans or issuers, HIPAA does not prevent employers
from using or disclosing the information to discriminate
against employees.2 1
B. GINA's Contribution: Creating Unified Protections
in Health Insurance
GINA fills in the gaps of current federal law such that all health
insurers - whether governmental, private, group or individual-would
be forbidden to discriminate on the basis of genetic information.
Health insurers may not use genetic information to determine eligibil-
ity or set premiums. They cannot use genetic information to impose
enrollment restrictions or adjust premium or contribution amounts.
Health insurers may not require or even request genetic testing or test
results, except as necessary for treatment, payment or health care
operations. This includes requesting, requiring or purchasing genetic
information prior to enrollment.
The bill also specifies that these prohibitions shall not interfere
with the delivery of health care services. For instance, it does not
limit the authority of the treating health care professional to request
that an individual or family member undergo a genetic test. Nor does
it limit the authority of a health care professional employed by or
affiliated with a health plan or issuer from notifying an individual
about genetic tests or providing information about a genetic test if it
constitutes part of a bona fide wellness program. However, the law
does prohibit a health care professional from requiring that an indi-
vidual undergo a genetic test.
1. Uniform Definitions for the Health Insurance Provisions of GINA
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2007 has the
advantage of uniformity of definitions. Title I of GINA, concerning
health insurance practices and policies, provides definitions that apply
to ERISA, PHSA, and SSA (Medigap).
200 Hustead & Goldman, supra note 113, at 292.
201 Nancy J. King, Sukanya Pillay & Gail A. Lasprogata, Workplace Privacy
and Discrimination Issues Related to Genetic Data: A Comparative Law Study of the
European Union and the United States, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 79, 135 (2006).
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* "Family member" means the spouse of the individual, de-
pendent children including both biological and adoptive
children, and all other individuals related by blood to the
individual or individual's spouse.2 °2 The committee deter-
mined that this broad definition of family member would
prevent issuers and plans from using family history as a sur-
rogate for genetic information.20 3
" The term "genetic information" has the broad definition of
information about an individual's genetic tests, genetic tests
of family members, or the occurrence of a disease or disor-
der in family members of an individual.204  However,
genetic information in this context does not include infor-
mation about the sex and age of the individual.2 °5
* "Genetic test" includes "analysis of human DNA, RNA,
chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites, that detects geno-
,,206types, mutations, or chromosomal changes. However,
this definition does not include other types of protein or me-
tabolite tests that do not detect genotype, nor does it include
an analysis of protein or metabolite testing that directly re-
lates to a "manifested disease [or] disorder ... that could
reasonably be detected by a health care professional with
appropriate training and expertise in the field of medicine
involved., 20 7  The interaction between "genetic informa-
tion" and "genetic test" definitions ensures that individuals
gain refuge from presymptomatic discrimination, and still
allows insurance issuers the ability to use the actuarial proc-
ess to underwrite insurance policies. In this case, GINA
precludes insurance companies from considering genetic in-
formation, including family history, as well as the results
from genetic testing, both predictive in nature. If an
individual goes in for a thorough check up and genetic
screening, the insurance companies may only consider the
information pertaining to already manifested, preexisting
medical conditions - and may not consider genetic informa-
tion which only provides a probability of developing a con-
dition.
202 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233,
§ 101, 122 Stat. 881, 885 (2008).
203 S. REP. No. 110-48, at 16 (2007).
204 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 101, 122 Stat. at 885.
205 Id.
206 § 101, 122 Stat. at 885.
207 § 101, 122 Stat. at 885-86.
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0 "Genetic services" is a new term, created to encompass ge-
netic tests, genetic counseling and genetic education. In ad-
dition to protecting individuals from discrimination when
applying for insurance, Congress intended to provide addi-
tional incentive for individuals to participate in and support
the development of genetic sciences. Genetic research and
education relies upon the voluntary participation of indi-
viduals. Without this added protection, individuals may
refuse to participate or seek genetic counseling for fear of
discrimination.
With the great variety of state law and federal law that define
these terms in variegated ways, this set of uniform definitions creates
greater consistency and regularity across the country.
2. Amending ERISA, PHSA and SSA
The amendments provided by GINA clarify and expand the non-
discrimination protections available under ERISA. 208 ERISA already
prohibits discrimination against participants and beneficiaries based
on genetic information for enrollment or determination of premi-
ums.
20 9 GINA provides new protection by preventing insurance com-
panies and issuers from using genetic information to determine
premiums for the entire group based upon one individual's (or family
member's) genetic information.
Further, GINA amends ERISA to prohibit group health plans and
health insurance issuers from requesting or requiring that the individ-
ual undergo a genetic test.2 1 However, this prohibition pertains only
to the issuer or group health plan. Congress did not intend to prevent
health care providers from being able to recommend genetic tests.
With the development of genetic testing, this information may become
essential for treatment and preventative medicine.2 '
Moreover, GINA's amendments to the PHSA provide new protec-
tion for the individual insurance market. GINA adds a new section
prohibiting health discrimination on the basis of genetic information.
Similar to the group health market regulations, insurance companies
and issuers may no longer use genetic information to determine eligi-
bility for insurance or to calculate premium and contribution rates.
208 See § 101, 122 Stat. at 886.
209 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 702, 29 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(1)(F) (2008).
210 HHS medical privacy rules regulate issues concerning the use, disclosure,
and gathering of existing genetic information.
211 S. REP. No. 110-48, at 19-20 (2007).
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Furthermore, amendments to the PHSA prohibit insurance issuers
from requesting or requiring genetic tests from individuals. As with
amendments to ERISA, the limitations on genetic testing do not im-
pede health care professionals, regardless of whether they are
employed by or affiliated with the issuer, from recommending genetic
tests for patients. GINA also closes a loophole in current PHSA legis-
lation. Non-federal government plans are currently exempt from this
genetic information nondiscrimination duty. GINA effectively elimi-
nates this exception. All government plans, both state as well as
federal, are now required to desist from genetic discrimination
because of GINA.
Finally, GINA's amendments to the SSA prohibit issuers of
Medicare supplemental policies from conditioning eligibility or set-
ting premiums on the basis of genetic information from the individual.
Also, genetic testing may not be requested or required as a condition
of insurance coverage. Again, these limits on genetic testing do not
restrain health care providers from requesting genetic tests or provid-
ing genetic services to covered individuals.
3. GINA - Closing the Gaps
GINA's privacy and confidentiality provisions apply to ERISA,
the PHSA and to the Internal Revenue Code § 9831 (a)(2) concerning
group health plans. GINA bases its protection of genetic information
on the existing SSA and HIPAA regulations. Notwithstanding these
current regulations, GINA will prohibit group health plans, health
insurance issuers and issuers of Medicare supplemental policies from
disclosing or using genetic information for purposes of underwriting,
eligibility determinations, premium ratings, creation and renewal of
policies, as well as coverage and benefits. It also prohibits group
health plans, health insurance issuers, and issuers of Medicare sup-
plemental policies from requesting, requiring, buying or collecting
genetic information for purposes of underwriting, eligibility determi-
nations, premium ratings, creation and renewal of policies, as well as
coverage and benefits. 212
GINA's privacy and confidentiality protections do contain some
limitations. First, collection of genetic information is permitted in the
limited situation of "incidental collection". If a plan or issuer receives
genetic information incidental to other health information requests
(e.g., physical exams, or blood or urine tests), it is not in violation of
GINA so long as the information was not requested or required and is
212 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 105, 122 Stat. at 903-05.
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not used for any underwriting or eligibility purposes. Second, the
confidentiality standard does not extend to health care and insurance
entities not covered by the SSA or HIPAA. Furthermore, the confi-
dentiality standards do not apply to genetic information that is not
individually identifiable. This permits the collection and use of
genetic information in such situations as research and development of
genetic science. 13
GINA must coordinate with existing SSA and HIPAA provisions
under the auspices of the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS). HHS bears responsibility for the enforcement of these provi-
sions, utilizing the remedies available under the SSA. As new federal
law, GINA preempts current state laws, unless the state law imposes
requirements or standards more stringent than GINA does. 14
GINA effectively closes one of the largest gaps left by HIPAA
legislation. Insurance issuers may no longer require individuals to
undergo genetic testing and may no longer establish eligibility rules,
premium levels or coverage based upon an individual's genetic infor-
mation. As long as the individual meets the eligibility standard
created by HIPAA, the individual will have guaranteed access to
health insurance.21S Insurance issuers still retain the ability to deny
coverage to those individuals ineligible under HIPAA. Additionally,
these prohibitions on the use and disclosure of genetic information
will close the loopholes in the group health plan market.
4. Residual Concerns for Health Insurance Protection
Although GINA closes some of the gaps in current legislation, it
does not close all of the potential loopholes. On the positive side of
the ledger, GINA expressly treats genetic information as protected
health information (PHI), thereby eliminating potential loopholes
where genetic information had not previously been protected. How-
ever, GINA's limited definition of genetic test - narrower than the
medical or scientific definition that is both predictive and diagnostic -
may leave diagnostic genetic information unprotected.216 For exam-
ple, information derived from the analysis of proteins or metabolites
directly related to a manifested disease does not constitute genetic
213 Id.
214 See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008).
215 Rich & Ziegler, supra note 182, at 37.
216 Hustead & Goldman, supra note 113, at 301; SCHOONMAKER & WILLIAMS,
supra note 30, at 29-30.
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information for the purposes of this section.217 This may lead to con-
fusing situations. For example, consider a woman diagnosed with
cancer. If the DNA from her tumor is tested and the tumor has not yet
been removed, the information is protected. However, if the tumor
proteins are analyzed, the information may or may not be protected
because protein tests of tumors are not covered in the definition of
"genetic testing" if the tumor does not qualify as part of that person.
For yet another puzzling twist, the information regarding a removed
tumor may be protected because it will no longer be a manifested
disease.218 Nonetheless, this limited definition may represent an
attempt to strike a balance between genetic nondiscrimination and the
correct functioning of the actuarial process in health insurance.
Second, because GINA is based upon HIPAA provisions, it does not
redefine or enlarge the types of entities or information that are subject
to the confidentiality, disclosure and use prohibitions. Thus, pharma-
ceutical companies and laboratories still remain outside the reach of
regulations, and the information must still be in the insurance claims-
type format to garner protection.
5. Enforcement and Remedies: Are They Sufficient?
One of the largest concerns about the effectiveness of GINA re-
gards the remedies and enforcement provisions. Unlike the employ-
ment title of GINA, the health insurance provisions do not provide a
unitary standard for remedies and enforcement.
GINA adds a provision to ERISA, § 502,219 concerning Civil En-
forcement, which adds the enforcement of genetic nondiscrimination
requirements. 220 Thus, all proven genetic nondiscrimination concerns
benefit from the established remedies under ERISA. ERISA lets
group health plan participants or the Department of Labor sue for
equitable relief. With respect to a group health plan, a participant or
beneficiary may seek injunctive relief before exhausting administra-
tive remedies if taking time to pursue administrative remedies would
cause irreparable harm to the participant's health. Where a participant
or beneficiary obtains equitable relief under ERISA for a genetic dis-
crimination claim, the court has the discretion to reinstate coverage
217 SCHOONMAKER & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 30.
218 Id. at 31-32. Please refer to Table 2, Examples of Genetic Testing Scenar-
ios and Protected Information Under S. 306 and H.R. 1227, for a detailed study of
which situations would be covered.
219 Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 502, 29 U.S.C. §
1132 (2008).
220 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233,
§ 101, 122 Stat. 881, 886 (2008).
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retroactive to the date of violation and can award a penalty to the
participant. The penalty amount payable to the individual is the same
as the primary penalty that may be assessed by the Secretary under the
prior law enforcement regime.
However, GINA does not grant plan beneficiaries the right to sue
for equitable relief under the PHSA,22' SSA and HIPPA. Rather,
health insurance plans covered by these laws restrict themselves to the
administrative relief already provided for by the SSA. For example, if
an insurance company discriminates against an individual when mak-
ing a coverage decision and that individual complains to HHS, the
Secretary has the discretion to impose a penalty on the insurer ranging
from $100 to $25,000 per violation.222 Should the insurer wrongfully
disclose individually identifiable genetic information, the Secretary
has the discretion to impose a penalty of up to $50,000; this penalty
may increase to $250,000 and up to 10 years in prison if done with the
intention to sell, transfer or use the information for commercial advan-
tage, personal gain or malicious harm.223
Although GINA's amendments to pre-existing law raise the bar
for genetic nondiscrimination, they may not provide adequate reme-
dies for the individual. As it stands, only those individuals covered by
ERISA insurance plans qualify for equitable relief. For those not cov-
ered under ERISA, the road of petitioning the Secretary of HHS to
enforce the genetic nondiscrimination protections promised by GINA,
with all its challenges, remains before them. Further, lawmakers must
reconcile equitable relief with a potential increase in opportunistic and
unnecessary litigation from disgruntled beneficiaries. Nonetheless,
nondiscrimination legislation may not prove as successful as antici-
pated without adequate enforcement and remedies.
VI. PREVENTING GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
IN THE WORKPLACE
A. Current Federal Prohibitions of Genetic Discrimination
Before GINA, a motley assortment of federal legislation provided
the barriers against genetic discrimination in employment. Federal
employees have a legal bulwark against genetic discrimination in
Executive Order 13,145. All other employees depend upon the
protections afforded by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
221 Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 300ii-4 (2000).
222 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (2000).
223 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2000).
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Americans with Disabilities Act of 1992. As discussed below, these
federal protections do not provide integrated, equal protection.
GINA's employment provisions extend refuge for all employees
based on a civil rights model.
1. Executive Order 13,145
Executive Order 13,145 buffers federal employees from genetic
discrimination. President Clinton signed Executive Order 13,145 on
February 8, 2000, prohibiting discrimination against federal govern-
ment employees based upon genetic information or requests for
genetic information.224 Through the interaction of its provisions, this
executive order relates to genetic discrimination in both employment
and health insurance contexts. Section 2-202 forbids employing
departments and agencies from discharging, failing to hire, segregat-
ing or depriving employees of compensation, privileges or opportuni-
ties based upon the employee's protected genetic information. The
employing department or agency may not request, require, collect or
purchase genetic information. Furthermore, it may not disclose
genetic information unless requested by the concerned employee or
required by court order. Genetic information obtained through
employee consent or genetic monitoring for toxic substances must
stay in files separate from general personnel files. Sections 1-202(c),
1-301 (b)(4), and 2-202(a) and (b) additionally act together to prohibit
the improper use of genetic information with respect to government-
provided health insurance.225 Employing departments and agencies
may not legally use genetic information in all contexts, with the
exception of medical treatment. Health insurance coverage, a part of
employee compensation and benefits, also gains aegis from discrimi-
nation based on genetic information.
Additionally, this executive order uses a broad definition of the
term "genetic information". Section 1-201(e) defines genetic infor-
mation as any information about an employee's genetic tests, genetic
tests of the employee's family members, and family history. Informa-
tion obtained concerning current health conditions, such as blood and
urine samples, sex, age or physical exams, does not fall under this
definition.
224 Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6,877 (Feb. 10, 2000).
225 Rich & Ziegler, supra note 182, at 26.
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2. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it illegal for
employers to discriminate against any individual based upon race,
color, sex, nationality, or religion.226 However, the plain language of
the statute does not mention genetic information. For an individual to
qualify indirectly for protection under the Civil Rights Act, the
genetic discrimination alleged must be disproportionately related to a
protected group listed under the statute.2 27 For example, Tay-Sachs
Disease appears more commonly among individuals of Eastern
European Jewish descent, whereas sickle-cell anemia predominates in
Africans. If an employer discriminates against individuals based upon
these or similar genetic conditions, then the employee may qualify for
protection under the Civil Rights Act. If the genetic information does
not disparately impact a protected group, then the individual has no
cause of action.228 GINA extends the civil rights protection of the
Civil Rights Act into the important realm of genetic non-
discrimination.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has
enforcement powers under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which
prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. The procedures and remedies under GINA
mirror current law. Employees who believe they have a claim must
file a charge with the EEOC or the appropriate state agency. The
EEOC will investigate the claim and bring suit on behalf of the
employee if evidence of a violation is found. The EEOC may also
pursue mediation if the employer and employee agree to that option.
In cases in which the EEOC chooses not to bring suit, the employee
may bring suit independently. Penalties for Title VII violations
include reinstatement, back pay, injunctive relief, equitable relief, and
attorney's and expert witness fees. Certain caps on damages may
apply depending on the size of the employer.
3. Americans with Disabilities Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides some, albeit
insufficient, barriers against genetic discrimination. The ADA, passed
in 1990, addresses employment discrimination against qualified indi-
viduals with disabilities. It operated based upon the animating princi-
226 S. REP. No. 110-48, at 11 (2007); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (2000 & Supp. V 2007).
227 S. REP. No. 110-48, at 11.
221 S. REP. No. 110-48, at 11.
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pie that applicants and employees should be selected by their ability
and willingness to do the job, not rejected based on their
disabilities.229
All private-sector employers with at least fifteen employees must
comply with ADA regulations. These regulations influence employ-
ment policies and practices, as well as establish privacy standards for
employees' medical information. Specifically, the ADA has estab-
lished human resources procedures for medical examinations, medical
information requests and confidentiality.
23
'
Employers have the prerogative to request or require medical
examinations of job applicants who have conditional offers of
employment, but only if all similarly situated employees undergo the
same examination. The ADA regulates the three instances during
employment in which an employer may require medical tests from
employees. First, employers may not require medical tests during the
pre-employment phase.232 This includes medical questionnaires and
exams, family history and tests for genetic conditions. However, an
employer may ask questions concerning the candidate's ability to
perform certain physical tasks. 233 Second, employers may condition
employment on the passage of medical examinations, so long as: (a)
the examination applies to all employees in the same job category; (b)
information collected remains in separate, confidential medical files
that may be consulted only for emergency situations, safety concerns
or governmental investigations; and (c) any conditions revealed by the
examination demonstrably render the individual unable to perform the
specific job. Finally, any post-employment medical examinations
must be voluntary or job-related.234
Accordingly, employers may receive health information concern-
ing applicants and employees only if it relates to the employee's abil-
ity to perform the job.235 However, employers may not discriminate
against disabled-but-qualified individuals when making employment
decisions or choices relating to conditions and privileges of employ-
ment. They cannot revoke offers or make decisions regarding promo-
229 Miller, supra note 71, at 174.
230 King et al., supra note 201, at 122-23.
231 Id. at 122.
232 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §
12112 (d)) (2)(A) (2007); King et al., supra note 201, at 127.
233 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B).
234 Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment and the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 29 Hous. L. Rev. 23, 55 (1992); 42 U.S.C. §
12112(d)(4)(B); King et al., supra note 201, at 127-28.
235 SCHOONMAKER & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 13.
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tions based upon that health information. 36  Thus, individuals
protected by the ADA for hiring and firing decisions should also
receive the same health insurance coverage granted to similarly situ-
ated employees.
In addition to addressing medical testing and information, the
ADA protects applicants' and employees' medical information.
Employers must treat this information as confidential, maintain the
information in separate files, and may not disclose the information,
except in specific circumstances.237 Employers can obtain genetic
information about an applicant or employee only during the condi-
tional offer phase of employment in four ways: (1) perform a genetic
test; (2) require the release of medical records or history which con-
tains genetic information; (3) use available genetic information stored
in computerized databases; and (4) obtain the individual's family his-
238tory. However, the ADA limits the collection of this information
through the comprehensive testing regulations mentioned above.
2 39
Furthermore, employees receive additional privacy protections
because employers do not have legal permission to request medical
information that does not assess ability to perform the job or relate to
accommodation or business necessity. Family leave laws also limited
employers by restricting the medical information employers may
request when granting leave. 240
To qualify for protection under the ADA, individuals must meet
one of the three prongs of the statute: (1) the individual currently has a
disability; (2) the individual has a medical record of having had a
disability; or (3) the individual is regarded as having a disability.241
However, uncertainty remains whether an employee with a genetic
condition has protection from discrimination based upon the ADA
alone.
4. Is the ADA Sufficiently Broad?
Indications of legislative intent to cover genetic discrimination
appear in the congressional record. Congressman Major Owens and
his colleagues expressed the aspiration that "[t]hese protections of the
ADA will also benefit individuals who are identified through genetic
236 Id.
237 King et al., supra note 201, at 125.
238 Id. at 94.
239 Id. at 125.
240 Id. at 129-30.
241 Silvers & Stein, supra note 15, at 1361; Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §12102(2) (2007).
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tests as being carriers of a disease-associated gene. 242 People with
genetic diseases, like those with other disabilities, may find them-
selves discriminated against because of the social stigmas that may
attach to these undesirable differences.
243
Certain gene-associated diseases clearly come under the ADA,
such as muscular dystrophy, Williams syndrome, retinitis pigmentosa,
osteogenesis imperfecta, and multiple sclerosis. Some of these
diseases move through stages, potentially causing the employee to
have certain limitations in the future and to be regarded as having a
particular disability. 2"
Furthermore, the EEOC has stated its position that genetic dis-
crimination falls within the scope the ADA.245 In 1995, the EEOC
determined that the ADA covers genetic discrimination under the
"regarded as" prong of the legislation.246 This position emerged again
upon the ADA's tenth anniversary in 2000, and expanded further
when the EEOC stated that blood tests detecting genetic markers or
diseases constitute medical examinations covered by the ADA.24 7
Specifically, Commissioner Miller stated that a person is "regarded as
having a disability" if a covered entity mistakenly believes an individ-
ual has a substantially limiting impairment, when in fact the impair-
ment does not so limit. "Under such a theory, [obtaining] coverage
for individuals with a genetic predisposition would generally rely on
demonstrating a mistaken belief concerning the major life activity of
working., 248 Since the EEOC's guidelines do not bind courts, con-
cern persists that the ADA framework insufficiently protects individu-
als from genetic discrimination, as courts may disregard the EEOC
guidelines. 49
Without GINA, the courts would have determined whether a par-
ticular genetic condition stays within the orbit of the ADA.250 The
Supreme Court has not yet decided if the ADA covers genetic infor-
242 Silvers & Stein, supra note 15, at 1361; 136 CONG. REC. H4614-02 (1990),
available at 1990 WL 97270, at H4623.
243 Silvers & Stein, supra note 15, at 1361.
244 Id. at 1361-62.
245 Id. at 1362-63; Jacobi, supra note 147, at 369; SCHOONMAKER &
WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 13.
246 Miller, supra note 71, at 174-75.
247 Silvers & Stein, supra note 15, at 1362-63.
248 Paul S. Miller, Is there a Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic Discrimination
in the Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 225, 246 (1999-2000); see Silvers &
Stein, supra note 15, at 1363.
249 Miller, supra note 71, at 175.
250 See King et al., supra note 201, at 130.
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mation, and recent decisions indicate that the Court tends towards
limiting the application of the ADA, rather than expanding it.
25
'
The Supreme Court determined that the ADA sets a "demanding
standard" for disability. The term "major life activity" must be an
activity of central importance in that person's life. Moreover, the
disability must currently present substantial limitations; a past condi-
tion or a future condition is not sufficient to warrant ADA protection
under this prong.252 However, by definition, genetic predispositions
have not yet expressed and may never do so. Thus, they do not sub-
stantially affect major life activities. Demonstrating that a person is
truly "regarded as" having a disability, another prong under the ADA,
is also fraught with difficulties.253
Furthermore, the ADA does not provide consistent coverage for
genetic conditions. Genetic law scholar Mark Rothstein broke down
the broader category of genetic conditions into seven different groups
and analyzed each group's potential coverage by the ADA:
25 4
" Already expressed genetic diseases fall under the ADA
category of those having impairment - so long as the
disease substantially limits a major life activity. 5  For
example, substantially limiting diseases with a genetic com-
ponent include muscular dystrophy (an x-linked genetic
disorder), multiple sclerosis, achondroplastic dwarfism,
adult polycystic kidney disease, cystic fibrosis, hemophilia
and diabetes mellitus.256
" Already expressed minor genetic conditions, although ex-
pressed, do not rise to the level of ADA coverage because
these conditions do not substantially limit a major life activ-
ity.257 Physical characteristics such as eye or hair color,
height, and weight remain outside of the ADA's shield. 8
They do not substantially limit major life activities, such as
walking, talking, working or caring for oneself. 259 For
example, some genetic conditions which do not meet the
ADA's standard for protection include wearing eyeglasses,
251 Jacobi, supra note 147, at 369.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 370.
254 Rothstein, supra note 234, at 39-52.
255 Id. at 39.
256 Id. at 40.
257 Id. at 41.
258 Id.
259 Id.
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mild to moderate varicose veins, left handedness, poor
impulse control, strabismus or osteoarthritis.26°
" Unexpressed late-onset genetic diseases should be protected
under the ADA under either the current disability strand or
the "regarded as" strand. The ADA does not address this
group, but legislative history and case law seem to indicate
that the ADA's reach extends to this group. 261 Late-onset
genetic diseases also place themselves under the "regarded
as" prong because of the future health risks associated with
the genetic condition. For example, if a parent has adult
polycystic kidney disease (APKD), an autosomal dominant
disorder, a fifty percent chance exists that the child will
develop the disease.262 Employers might want to exclude
the individual from employment because of the risk of
steep, future health care costs. 26 3
" Genetic predisposition/increased risk have been rejected by
the EEOC as genetic conditions which merit ADA protec-
tion. All individuals - healthy or otherwise - have inherited
genetic predispositions. If an individual's father had cancer
or mother had diabetes, the individual may inherit proclivi-
ties to developing either or both conditions. However, the
EEOC determined that such a family history does not find
refuge in the ADA because that person may not already
have the disease and may never suffer from it.264
* Unaffected carriers of recessive and X-linked disorders re-
tain the most risk for genetic discrimination because of their
children who have or who may have the genetic disorder.265
ADA §102(b)(4) defines "discriminate" to include "exclud-
ing or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a quali-
fied individual because of the known disability of an indi-
vidual with whom the qualified individual is known to have
a relationship or association., 266 This section would extend
protection to individuals with diseases such as AIDS, Tay-
Sachs and cystic fibrosis. 267 However, this protection might
260 Id. at 42.
261 Id. at 43.
262 Id. at 45.
263 Id.
264 Id. at 46-47.
265 Id. at 47.
266 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4)
(2007).
267 Rothstein, supra note 234, at 47.
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not extend to employees who have not yet had children.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the individual would be
protected as already having the disease because of the sub-
stantial limitation on the major life activity of procrea-
tion. 68 It also remains unclear whether the individual
would be able to gain a buffer under the "regarded as"
branch due to being regarded as carrying the disease.269
* Those having a record of a genetic disease attain coverage
under the EEOC guidelines of the ADA, similar to those
who already had an impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity such as cancer or heart disease, both
prevalent in this country. The ADA protects these indi-
viduals because of the discrimination faced long after
270recovery.
* Those regarded as having a genetic disease receive protec-
tion by the ADA in three specific situations: (1) the im-
pairment does not substantially limit the employee, but the
employer perceives it to do so; (2) the impairment substan-
tially limits the employee only because of the attitude of
others; or (3) the individual does not have an impairment
but is regarded as having a substantially limiting impair-
271
ment. Some examples of such conditions with a genetic
basis include neurofibromatosis, Tourette syndrome and
Down syndrome.272
The ADA's "safe harbor" provision in §501(c) permits insurers
and employers providing insured or self-insured plans to conduct ac-
tuarial risk analysis when determining coverage for employees. This
safe harbor protects these actions so long as the risk analysis does not
consist of a "subterfuge" for illegal discrimination.273 In the EEOC's
interpretation, employers and insurers must justify the costs and risks
associated with coverage to comply with an overall actuarial fair-
ness. 27 4 However, the majority of courts have adopted the Supreme
Court's interpretation of "subterfuge" contained in the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA), meaning "a scheme, plan, strata-
gem, or artifice of evasion., 275 This definition broadens the safe
268 Bragdon, 524 U.S. 624.
269 Rothstein, supra note 234, at 48-49.
270 Id. at 50.
271 Id. at 51.
272 Id. at 51-52.
273 Jacobi, supra note 147, at 370.
274 Id. at 370-71.
275 Id. at 371.
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harbor contained in the ADA and substantially increases the plaintiff's
burden. Instead of providing a prima facie case of poor business
judgment, the employee would need to prove a clear discriminatory
motive based on the employee's genetic condition.276
Furthermore, the majority of courts will defer to employers'
determinations as to whether an individual's condition would prevent
them from doing their job. Employers must determine whether or not
the individual qualifies for that job, and if the individual cannot
perform those functions, the ADA does not require their retention.
The vast majority of courts have deferred to employers' decisions for
what constitute essential tasks for a specific job, and have ruled as a
matter of law in favor of the employers.277
Similarly, employers benefit from the "direct threat" affirmative
defense. In the event that an employee's disability - whether it is the
disease itself or the individual's ability to perform the job in a safe
manner - creates a public health risk or endangers fellow employees,
the employer may treat the employee differently from others. Fur-
thermore, the "direct threat" defense has expanded after a recent
Supreme Court decision. In Chevron v. Echazabal, the Supreme
Court ruled upon the EEOC's regulation and held that employers may
treat currently or potentially disabled employees differently if they
pose a direct threat to themselves, as well as to other employees or the
public. 2
78
The ADA does not prohibit employers from obtaining medical
information about the employee once hired. ADA regulations permit
employers to conduct ongoing medical examinations, provided that
the examinations relate to the job or the employee voluntarily under-
goes the examinations. On the one hand, this approach may help
employers accommodate employees with disabilities and comply with
OSHA regulations which authorize testing for individuals who work
with toxic agents. On the other hand, the ADA does not prevent
employers from using genetic information to discriminate against and
remove an employee in order to avoid such responsibilities.279
276 Id. at 372; See Silvers & Stein, supra note 15, at 1369-70.
277 Silvers & Stein, supra note 15, at 1366-67 (footnote omitted).
278 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86-87 (2002).
279 Silvers & Stein, supra note 15, at 1366.
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B. GINA: Providing New Protections in Employment Law
1. Prohibition of Acquisition and Use of Genetic Information
Title II of GINA covers genetic nondiscrimination in employ-
ment. Employers may not use genetic information in employment
decisions, including hiring, firing, job assignments and promotions.280
This prohibition extends to employment agencies in regards to
employee referrals, labor organizations in regards to membership in
the organization, and labor-management training programs.281
As for insurers, GINA also makes it unlawful for these employer
entities to request, require or purchase genetic information. It also
eliminates the options of requesting or requiring genetic testing as a
condition of employment.282 This prohibition extends to family mem-
bers, which not only include blood relatives, but also spouses and
even adopted children.
However, five limited exceptions to the ban on requesting, requir-
ing or purchasing genetic information exist:
283
1. where the employer inadvertently requests or requires fam-
ily medical history
2. where the employee uses an employer-sponsored wellness
program
3. where the employer requests or requires family medical his-
tory to comply with federal and state family and medical
leave laws
4. where the employer purchases publicly available commer-
cial documents (e.g., newspapers or magazines) that contain
genetic information
5. where the information is required for genetic monitoring of
the biological effects of toxic substances in the workplace,
provided that the employee gives informed consent and the
monitoring complies with federal and state law.284
280 S. REP. No. 110-48, at 4 (2007); Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 202, 122 Stat. 881, 907 (2008).
281 S. REP. No. 110-48, at 4; Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act §§
203-205, 122 Stat. at 908-13.
282 SCHOONMAKER & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 36.
283 S. REP. No. 110-48, at 4; Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act §
204, 122 Stat. at 910-11; King et al., supra note 201, at 140.
284 See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-
78 (2000); Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 801 (1977);
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296b (2000).
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However, nothing in these provisions would prevent health care
professionals from requesting or recommending that an employee or
family member undergo genetic testing within the context of provid-
ing medical care.285
2. Confidentiality and Disclosure
Should an employer, employment agency, labor organization or
labor-management training program obtain access to genetic informa-
tion, it must comply with GINA confidentiality provisions. Such ge-
netic information must be kept on separate forms and in separate files,
which must be treated as confidential medical records. The employer
may not disclose genetic information unless the employer also dis-
closes it to the employee to whom it applies. Also, the employer must
comply with federal 286 and state family leave laws or a court order.
287
This section provides more protection for the employee's genetic in-
formation than exists under the ADA. GINA provisions prohibit su-
pervisors from gaining access to the employee's medical informa-
tion.288 The requirement of separate forms and files effectively cre-
ates an information firewall.
GINA also forbids disclosure of genetic information, except to the
employee, health researchers, or in compliance with federal and state
law. As to the research related dimension of GINA, Francis Collins
stated prior to the passage of GINA: "We know that many people
have refused to participate in research for fear of genetic discrimina-
tion. This means that without the kind of legal protections offered by
this bill, our clinical research protocols will lack participants, and
those who do participate will represent a self-selected group, thus
further compromising research.5
2 89
One of the potential weaknesses of GINA, however, concerns the
protection of genetic information obtained indirectly. Employers who
obtain genetic information about their employees indirectly but legally
through compliance with other laws (such as the Family and Medical
Leave Act) or through certain efforts to preserve employee health
would not be penalized unless they used such information to discrimi-
nate against the employee. A real danger fraught with evidentiary
285 SCHOONMAKER & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 36.
286 See generally The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 § 103, 29
U.S.C. 2613 (1993) ("An employer may require that a request for leave .... be sup-
ported by a certification issued by the health care provider...").
287 S. REP. No. 110-48, at 4.
288 King et al., supra note 201, at 142.
289 Collins, supra note 1.
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difficulties exists of the employer receiving genetic information in
legal ways, using that information illegally, and then rationalizing
such use on legal grounds.
3. Oversight and Enforcement
Rather than basing GINA legislation upon the ADA, the remedies
and enforcement provisions of GINA stem from the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and other statutes governing federal, state and congressional
employees. GINA protects employees and applicants as defined
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,290 state and federal employees,
congressional employees, and employees of the executive branch. 91
Employees alleging genetic discrimination must bring a claim before
the proper enforcement agency within the applicable statute of limita-
tions before filing suit in court. The compensatory and punitive dam-292
ages are proportionate to the size of the employer. The EEOC
would be charged with issuing regulations enforcing the employment
title one year after enactment. The Secretary of Labor would enforce
the employment related portions. Rules of construction in the legisla-
tion indicate that GINA does not limit an employee's rights under the
ADA, under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or under any other federal
or state statutes.293
4. No Disparate Impact Cause of Action
"Disparate impact" discrimination, while not an intentional
adverse employment action, produces a discriminatory effect on a
protected class caused by an employment practice or policy that
appears to be nondiscriminatory on its face. For claims brought under
GINA, disparate impact does not constitute a valid cause of action.
As the Commissioner for GINA, the EEOC is charged with establish-
ing and funding a Commission, and with continuing the study of the
genetic sciences. It will reconsider the disparate impact cause of
action six years after the adoption of GINA.29 4 The Commission
would determine whether GINA would benefit from a "disparate
impact" provision that would protect employees in situations where
the employer's actions inadvertently have a disproportionate adverse
effect on individuals with certain genetic traits.295
290 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
291 3 U.S.C. § 411(c).
292 S. REP. No. 110-48, at 4.
293 SCHOONMAKER & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 37.
294 S. REP. No. 110-48, at 4.
295 SCHOONMAKER & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 37.
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VII. FINANCIAL IMPACT OF GINA
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated an increase in
1000 people per year who would obtain insurance as a result of the
enactment of GINA, nearly all of whom would do so in the individual
market. Some of these premiums would be tax-deductible, decreasing
tax revenue for the U.S. government by less than half a million dollars
per year from 2006 (when this estimate was made) through 2015.
CBO estimated that implementing GINA would cost less than half
a million dollars in 2007 and about two million dollars over the 2006-
2015 period. By federal government standards, the bill would have no
significant effect on direct spending.
The preemption of and limitations on state and local actions as a
result of the enactment of GINA would be intergovernmental man-
dates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA), but
there is little indication that state, local, or tribal governments cur-
rently engage in or are likely to engage in the activities that the bill
would prohibit. Consequently, CBO estimates that the costs of the
mandates would not be significant, and would not exceed the
threshold established in the UMRA ($72 million in 2005, adjusted
annually for inflation).
CBO estimates that the direct costs of private-sector mandates on
health insurers, health plans, employers, labor unions, and other
organizations would not exceed the annual threshold specified in the
UMRA ($123 million in 2005, adjusted annually for inflation) in any
of the first five years in which the mandates would be effective.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The passage of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
advances civil rights in the 21 St century by providing a national stan-
dard across states, and supplements already existing federal law with
respect to health insurance and employment. This should boost
genetic research by mitigating the reluctance of potential genetic
research subjects due to possible genetic discrimination. The protec-
tions provided by GINA, while not a panacea, move substantially in
the direction of preventing genetic discrimination in two important
areas. Other areas, such as the educational sphere for example, could
benefit from similar protection.
The history of discrimination and eugenics in our society invite us
to learn critical lessons and apply them well in the midst of the
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Genetic Revolution - concomitantly replete with promise as well as
pitfalls. Although the law has generally lagged behind new develop-
ments in science and technology, GINA takes that rare step of antici-
pating, preventing and giving remedies for a wave of problems to
come as genetic science continues to forge forward. Indeed, GINA
helps to accelerate the rate of development of genetic science, while
helping to ensure that the wonders it brings do not also invite the
nightmares of genetic discrimination in the critical areas of employ-
ment and healthcare insurance. Its passage shines an auspicious light
for high-tech civil rights in the 21 "t century and beyond.

